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STRANGE THINGS ARE AFOOT AT THE CIRCLE K: 
AGENCY ACTION AGAINST LEASED SITES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL BANKRUPTCY 
Buckmaster de Wolf' 
I believe that the need to quickly resolve this health hazard transcended 
monetary considerations. 1 
The interaction of bankruptcy and environmental law is like sitting in 
a roO'YY/, with a guy holding a hand grenade, saying, 'If you come any 
closer, I'll blaw us all Up.'2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Responding to the growing problem of environmental contamina-
tion, federal and state agencies charged with environmental law en-
forcement (Agencies) have been given substantial statutory authority 
to ensure cleanup of contaminated sites and to punish illegal dum-
pers.3 Agency enforcement of environmental laws is often fruitless, 
however, if a party that is potentially responsible for cleanup of con-
tamination files for bankruptcy protection under the United States 
*Editor in Chief, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 B.R. 918, 924 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). 
2 Interview with Mark Stoler, Chief Counsel, Environment, Health & Safety, W.R. Grace & 
Co., in Newton, Mass. (Jan. 26,1993). 
3 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Release 
Prevention and Response Act, MAss. GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 1-19 (1988 & Supp. 1992); Environ-
mental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-1-13:1K-35 (West 1991); Spill 
Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11-58:10-23.50 (West 1991); New 
Hampshire Hazardous Waste Cleanup Fund Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:1-147-B:ll 
(1990 & Supp. 1992); Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§§ 6020.101-.1305 (1993); Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-
760.2 (1993). 
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Bankruptcy Code (Code).4 An Agency's action is usually stayed by the 
bankruptcy court and then, after receiving little compensation in the 
court's distribution of the debtor's assets, an Agency's claim is gener-
ally discharged by the court at the completion of the proceeding.5 
By filing bankruptcy, potentially responsible parties (PRPs) force 
Agencies to make creative use of various Code provisions to achieve 
higher priority for their claims in order to ensure payment from the 
debtor. Although the results have been inconsistent, this creativity 
has found some success, particularly in the form of state "superliens" 
and administrative expense priority.6 
The debtors, however, easily frustrate the Agencies' creative ef-
forts to gain higher priority by merely leasing the contaminated site, 
rather than owning the site. The existence of a lease defeats the 
Agencies' opportunities for a superlien or administrative expense 
priority, putting the Agencies' claims back in a bleak low priority 
position. 
Corporate leasing of sites is a common practice because of the low 
cost, tax savings, and increased fiexibility.7 Many of these leased sites 
are home to potential polluters such as coal mines, gas stations, and 
hazardous waste sites.8 The opportunity to avoid environmentalliabil-
ity may encourage corporations that are at risk of contaminating their 
sites to lease those sites in an effort to avoid clean-up liability through 
an improper attempt at bankruptcy planning. If a company is found 
responsible for contaminating a leased site, a bankruptcy proceeding 
provides an opportunity to simply walk away from liability for site 
cleanup. This opportunity frustrates the deterrent purpose of envi-
ronmentallaws and potentially burdens the general public with finan-
cial responsibility for cleanup. 
This Comment will discuss the interaction between environmental 
and bankruptcy laws, particularly focussing on the effect of corporate 
leasing. Section II discusses the deleterious effects of bankruptcy law 
on environmental law enforcement against corporations. Section III 
explores the various tools Agencies use to work within the Code to 
ensure payment from corporate debtors. Section IV discusses the 
4 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (amended 1984) 
(codified 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. III 1991». 
5 Gary E. Claar, The Case for a Bankruptcy Code Priority for Environmental Cleanup 
Claims, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 29, 33 (1992). 
6 See infra Section III. 
7 For a discussion of leases under the Code, see Don Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unex-
pired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1980). 
8 See infra Section IV. 
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specific effect the debtor's leasing a contaminated site has on these 
otherwise useful methods. Section V details the case of In re Circle 
K, a prime example of the treatment of contaminated leases in bank-
ruptcy. Finally, Section VI provides some possible solutions, including 
amending the Code to provide environmental claims with higher pri-
ority. 
II. THE UNSTOPPABLE FORCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MEETS 
THE IMMOVABLE ORJECT OF BANKRUPTCY 
A. Environmental Law 
The primary policy goals of federal and state environmental laws, 
particularly the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)9 and similarly constructed state 
statutes,lO are to ensure timely cleanup of hazardous waste and to 
allocate the financial burden of cleanup to the responsible parties as 
a deterrent against future contamination.H 
To that end, Agencies have been given extraordinary power to 
effect cleanup.12 Agencies have the power to order PRPs to clean up 
significantly contaminated sites.13 The group of PRPs under these 
statutes is potentially very large, usually including current owners 
942 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
10 See, e.g., Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Release Prevention and Response Act, MASS. 
GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 1-19 (1988 & Supp. 1992); Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-1-13:1K-35 (West 1991); Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11-58:10-23.50 (West 1991); New Hampshire Hazardous Waste Cleanup Fund 
Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:1-147-B:11 (1990 & Supp. 1992); Pennsylvania Hazardous 
Sites Cleanup Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.101-.1305 (1993). 
11 See, e.g., CERCLA 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, 
§§ 1-19 (1988 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-1-13:1K-35 (West 1991); N.H. REV, STAT. 
ANN. §§ 147-B:1-147-B:11 (1990 & Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.101-.1305 (1993). 
The provisions of CERCLA serve two goals. First, the federal government should be given 
the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to problems of a national magnitude 
and resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, those responsible for problems caused by 
the disposal of chemical poisons should bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the 
harmful conditions they created. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chems., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 
(D. Minn. 1982). 
12 See In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 B.R. 918, 924 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) 
(describing environmental liability as "potentially unlimited and untested"); Ridgway M. Hall, 
Jr., The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste Management, 38 Bus. LAW. 593 
(1983); Keith Schneider, New View Call Environmental Policy Misguided, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
1993, at AI. 
Ia See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 9 (Supp. 1992); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-9 (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-A:14 (1990 & Supp. 1992); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.1102 (1993). 
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and operators of a contaminated facility, those who owned or operated 
when the contamination occurred, transporters of the hazardous ma-
terials, and generators of the hazardous materials.I4 Furthermore, in 
order to encourage timely compliance with remediation orders,15 
many federal and state environmental laws allow Agencies to levy 
civil or criminal fines against PRPs for noncompliance.I6 These non-
compensatory, punitive penalties accrue for each day the violation 
remains uncorrected.I7 If the PRPs fail to comply with the order, an 
Agency may undertake the cleanup itself and then seek reimburse-
ment from the PRPs, who are jointly and severally liable.Is In order 
to ensure reimbursement, many statutes provide for a lien that arises 
to secure the cost of cleanup.19 
Finally, in order to encourage third party participation in clean-up 
The agency can sue the PRPs for statutorily permitted costs incurred in response actions 
taken with respect to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances. 
14 See, e.g., CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1989); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (Supp. 1992); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-13 (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (1990 & Supp. 1992); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.507,.702 (1993). 
15 In other words, clean-up orders. 
16 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 11 (Supp. 1992); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-30 (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:11 (1990); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.1104-.1105 (1993). 
17 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1988); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 11 (Supp. 1992); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-30 (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:11 (1990); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.1104-.1105 (1993). 
18 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1989); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (Supp. 1992); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-13 (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (1990 & Supp. 1992); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.507,.702 (1993). 
CERCLA does not provide for joint and several liability. Congress expressly left to the courts 
the determination of what standard of liability to impose under CERCLA, based on a case by 
case basis. See H. REP. No. 253(0, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 74, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 
2856 ("Explicit mention of joint and several liability was deleted from CERCLA in 1980 to allow 
courts to establish the scope of liability through a case-by-case application of 'traditional and 
evolving principles of common law' and pre-existing statutory law"). Subsequently, however, in 
enacting the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Congress 
endorsed the standard of joint and several liability imposed by the seminal case of United States 
v. Chern-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See also United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 
F.2d 160, 171 n.23 (4th Cir. 1988), cm. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 
B.R. 397, 414 (N.D. Tex. 1992). 
For a discussion of environmental liability in bankruptcy, see Patricia L. Quentel, EPA Issues 
Long-Awaited Lender Liability Rule, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10637, 10637 (1992); 
Claar, supra note 5, at 40; Laurel E. Lockett, Environmental Liability Enforcement and the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978: A Study of H.R. 2767, The "Superlien" Provision, 19 REAL PROP., 
PROB. AND TR. J. 859, 861 (1984); Joseph P. Cistulli, Note, Striking a Balance Between Compet-
ing Policies: The Administrative Claim as an Alternative 1b Enforce State Clean-Up Orders 
in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 581, 584 (1989). 
19 For a complete discussion of lien provisions, see infra Section III. A. 
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efforts, environmental laws also allow for equitable contribution be-
tween PRPs to reimburse third parties that undertake voluntary 
cleanup of contaminated sites.20 Under these statutes, any party, 
whether or not a PRP, who undertakes clean-up efforts consistent 
with an Agency's contingency plan is entitled to sue other PRPs for 
equitable contribution.21 
B. Bankruptcy Law 
If one of the PRPs involved with the contaminated site files for 
federal bankruptcy protection, the involved Agency's response 
scheme for cleanup of hazardous waste is greatly affected.22 The Bank-
ruptcy Code's principal policy of protecting the debtor from its credi-
tors is in direct conflict with the protection of human health and 
welfare goals of environmental law.23 The Code does not mention 
environmental clean-up obligations expressly, providing no special 
guidance as to how environmental claims should be treated in bank-
ruptcy.24 Due to this lack of direction, the treatment of environmental 
claims is most commonly resolved in favor of debtor and creditor 
protection, with federal bankruptcy law trumping state and federal 
environmentallaw.25 The case law, however, is very inconsistent.26 
Commercial bankruptcy filings have increased dramatically since 
20 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 4 (Supp. 
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:1O(b) (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.705 (1993). 
21 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 4 (Supp. 
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:1O(b) (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.705 (1993). 
22 See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Combustion Equip. 
Assoc., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 404. 
"The conflict begins at a basic level, since the goal of CERCLA-cleaning up toxic waste sites 
promptly and holding liable those responsible for the pollution-is at odds with the premise of 
bankruptcy, which is to allow debtors a fresh start by freeing them of liability. The two statutes 
also differ in their timing. To foster rapid cleanup, Congress embraced a policy of delaying 
litigation about clean-up costs until after the cleanup. Thus, under CERCLA, liability is not 
assessed until after the EPA has investigated a site, decided what remedial measures are 
necessary, and determined which PRPs will bear the costs. In re Combustion Equip. Assoc., 838 
F.2d at 37. 
23 See Claar, supra note 5, at 30; Cistulli, supra note 18, at 584. Thomas L. Stockard, Note, In 
re Chateaugay Carp.: An Analysis of the Interaction Between the Bankruptcy Code and 
CERCLA, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 443, 443 (1992). 
24 See In re Microfab, 105 B.R. 161, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). 
26 See Claar, supra note 5, at 30; Stockard, supra note 23, at 443. 
26 Campare Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274,279 n.5 (1985) (state environmental claims dischar-
geable in bankruptcy) with Midlantic Nat. Bank v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 
(bankruptcy trustee must comply with state environmental laws before permitting abandon-
ment of contaminated property), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986). 
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1981, with bankruptcy becoming a particularly common refuge of the 
environmental polluter.27 Indeed, with the average cost of a single 
Superfund cleanup soaring to between $30 and $40 million, many 
PRPs are being driven into bankruptcy by environmental liability 
alone.28 
The origins and process of bankruptcy have been explained briefly 
by one commentator29 as follows: 
Although bankruptcy proceedings can take many forms, they gen-
erally arise from a similar situation: the debtor's assets are inade-
quate to satisfy all its debts. Some of the debtor's creditors will 
have to suffer a financial loss. The federal bankruptcy system 
provides a forum to equitably distribute the loss among all of the 
debtor's creditors. 
Bankruptcy law serves three fundamental purposes when deal-
ing with the debtor's bleak financial situation. The first principal 
goal of bankruptcy is to give the debtor a fresh start in business 
and commercial life by relieving him or her from the weight of 
indebtedness that may have resulted from business misfortune. 
This goal is accomplished primarily by discharging the debtor's 
unpaid debts, essentially elevating the debtor's inability to pay to 
a legal right not to pay his or her debts. Another purpose of 
bankruptcy is to provide a set of equitable rules for the division 
of the debtor's property among his or her various creditors. Fi-
nally, bankruptcy law provides a mechanism for the rehabilitation 
or reorganization of a business debtor who has the capacity to stay 
in business. 
The debtor's reorganization is addressed under chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code and is designed to reduce the net loss of the 
creditors. If the corporate debtor has no feasible chance of reor-
ganization, then the debtor's assets are simply liquidated under 
chapter 7 of the Code and the proceeds are equitably distributed 
to the creditors.30 
In order to fulfill these three goals during the bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the creditors' claims against the debtor are handled in three 
distinct stages. First, at the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the Code 
stays collection efforts by most creditors. Second, during the proceed-
ing, the creditors' claims are ranked by priority and paid accordingly. 
27 See Thomas J. Salerno et al., Environmental Law and Its Impact on Bankruptcy Law -
Saga of "Toxins-R-Us" 25 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR.. J. 261, 262-63 (1990). 
28 See id.; William N. Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective 
on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10413, 10423 (1991). 
29 JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 52-53 
(1992). See Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(1918). 
30Id. 
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Third, at the completion of the proceeding, the Code discharges most 
unpaid claims against the debtor. At each one of these stages, the 
bankruptcy proceeding dramatically affects environmental actions 
against the debtor. 
1. The Bankruptcy Petition: The Automatic Stay and the Debtor's 
Estate 
When a corporation validly files for federal bankruptcy protection 
two Code provisions are immediately activated. First, under § 541 of 
the Code, a "bankruptcy estate" arises, which assumes ownership of 
all the debtor's legal and equitable property interests at the time of 
filing.3! The bankruptcy estate, under the control of either the trustee 
or the debtor in possession,32 holds the debtor's unencumbered assets 
for orderly and equitable distribution to the debtor's creditors.33 
Second, under § 362(a), an "automatic stay" freezes almost all ac-
tions against the debtor, including most new and continuing judicial 
and administrative proceedings and judgments.34 The protection af-
forded by the automatic stay is intended to be quite broad, stopping 
virtually all collection efforts by creditors with claims arising before 
the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection (prepetition).35 Before a 
creditor may attempt to collect payment from the debtor, the court 
31 11 u.s.c. § 541 (1988). The reach of the bankruptcy estate is intended to be quite broad. 
United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198,204 (1982). 
32 The participation of the trustee and the debtor in possession (the debtor) is different in 
chapter 7 from chapter 11. In a chapter 7 case, a trustee is always appointed to manage the 
liquidation of the debtor's assets and is given certain powers under the Code to facilitate this 
goal. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1988). In contrast, in a chapter 11 case, the trustee is only appointed for 
cause or at the request of an interested party. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). Furthermore, in a chapter 
11 case, the presumption is that the debtor will continue to run the business after the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed (postpetition) as the debtor in possession. Accordingly, the debtor in 
possession is given the same powers as the trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104 & 1107 (1988). 
33 United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988). 
34 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). 
35 Id. The stay prevents all collection efforts including all acts to obtain possession of property 
or payment from the debtor, the property of the debtor and property of the estate. Id.; 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(d) ("The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction over all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the 
commencement of such case, and of property of the estate."). 
See Arlene E. Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 
46 Bus. LAW. 626, 635 (1991); Jonathan K. Van Patten & Richard D. Puetz, Bankruptcy and 
Environmental Obligations: The Clash Between Private Relief and Public Policy, 35 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 220, 230 (1990); J. Craig Smith, Local Government Regulation and Bankruptcy: 
To Stay or Not To Stay, 21 URB. LAW. 151, 153 (1989); Richard J. Demarco, Note, Clean-Up 
Orders and the Bankruptcy Code: An Exception to the Automatic Stay, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
292, 294 (1985). 
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must approve the creditor's action.36 The stay gives the debtor a 
''breathing spell"37 to effect repayment or reorganization and thus, an 
opportunity for a "fresh start."38 
The stay is not meant, however, to be an absolute refuge for the 
debtor. Section 362(a) is subject to a series of exceptions set forth in 
§ 362(b) and § 105 of the Code.39 In relevant part, § 362(b) provides 
government police power and criminal exceptions/a and § 105 pro-
vides the court discretionary injunction power.41 
a. Civil Police Power Exception under § 362(b)(.4) & (5) 
The civil police power exception to the automatic stay allows gov-
ernmental units to pursue actions to judgment after the debtor has 
filed for bankruptcy (postpetition) in order to fix damages but does 
not allow enforcement of any judgment requiring expenditure of 
funds.42 Under § 362(b)(4), governmental civil actions against the 
debtor, commenced by entities pursuant to police or regulatory power, 
that arose or were commenced prepetition are exempt from the stay.43 
In applying the stay exception to governmental actions, the courts 
reason that filing for bankruptcy protection was not meant as a shield 
against government actions designed to protect the public's health, 
safety, and welfare.44 
36 11 u.s.c. § 362(a) (1988). The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over all "core proceedings," 
which is basically everything related to administration of the estate, claims against the estate, 
and other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). 
See City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d 1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Peerless Plating, 70 
B.R. 943, 945 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 269 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1986). 
37 See RAYMOND T. NIMMER & INGRID M. HILLINGER. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: SE-
CURED FINANCING 263 (1992). The Code's legislative history states that "[t]he automatic stay 
is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the 
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all 
foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or 
simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." H.R. REP. No. 
95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-44 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97. 
38 Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1902) (''Systems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve 
the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive and to permit 
him to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the obligation and respon-
sibilities which may have resulted from business misfortunes."). 
39 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b) & 105 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) & (5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (civil exception) and 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(b)(1)(1988 & Supp. III 1991) (criminal exception). 
41 See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988). 
4211 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) & (5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
43 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
44 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(NLRB actions to fix award in action to enforce back pay provision are not affected by automatic 
1993] CIRCLE K 153 
The § 362(b)(4) exception, however, only allows a governmental 
action to be brought to judgment to fix damages.45 Under § 362(b)(5) 
of the Code, a governmental unit may only enforce a judgment against 
the debtor or the property of the estate to the extent the judgment 
is not deemed a "money judgment."46 This "exception to the excep-
tion" is intended to prevent governmental abuse of police or regula-
tory power to gain an economic advantage over other creditors in the 
bankruptcy proceedingY Because the Code does not define money 
judgment, the courts generally look at "legal custom and practice to 
determine what was traditionally understood to be a recovery for 
money damages."48 The courts reason that by enforcing a money 
stay); Commonwealth Oil Ref. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency (In re Commonwealth 
Oil Ref.), 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986) (automatic stay did not apply to EPA actions to require 
debtor hazardous waste facility to comply with federal and state environmental laws), cert. 
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 910 (1986) (automatic stay did not apply to Title VII action); Cournoyer v. Town of 
Lincoln, 790 F.2d 971, 977 (1st Cir. 1986) (town's action to clear debtor's property of scrap metal 
and automotive parts exempt from automatic stay); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Re-
sources, 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1984) (state's action to compel debtor to correct violations of 
anti-pollution laws was exempt from automatic stay); Ahrens Aircraft v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 23 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (enforcement of NLRB order awarding back pay was not subject to automatic stay); 
National Labor Relations Bd. v. Evans Plumbing, 639 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.I981) (NLRB proceeding 
for entry of judgment for back pay was exempt from automatic stay). 
45 National Labor Relations Bd. v. Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988); National Labor Relations Bd. v. 
Edward Cooper Painting, 804 F.2d 934, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Mattiace Indus., 
73 B.R. 816, 818 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Standard Metals, 49 B.R. 623 (D. Colo. 
1985). 
46 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Technically, § 362(b)(5) should be applied only 
to judgments entered prepetition. The (b )(5) exception applies specifically to § 362(a)(2) which 
stays only "the enforcement, against the debtor or against the property of the estate, of a 
judgment obtained before commencement of the case . .. " Id. (emphasis added). Few courts have 
noted this distinction. Compare Brock v. Morysville Body Works, 829 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(court noted that because judgment was brought postpetition § 362(b)(5) was not implicated) 
with Commonwealth Oil Ref. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency (In re Commonwealth 
Oil Ref.), 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986) (not noting distinction in similar circumstance), cert. 
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). Courts rely instead on the legislative history, which states that 
"paragraph (5) makes clear that the exception extends to permit an injunction and enforcement 
of an injunction, and to permit the entry of a money judgment, but does not permit enforcement 
of a money judgment." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299. For a discussion of this issue, see William A. Shirley, The Precedence 
of Environmental Protection over Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection: Commonwealth v. United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 35 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 189, 199 (1989). 
47 National Labor Relations Bd. v. Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1991); 
In re Sam Daily Realty, 57 B.R. 83, 85 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) (Hawaii postpetition order 
suspending debtor's real estate license for prepetition violations not stayed, but concomitant 
civil penalty was stayed). 
48 Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 275 (3d Cir. 1984). See Mirsky, 
supra note 35, at 637. 
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judgment the Agency is impermissibly attempting to gain a pecuniary 
advantage in the proceeding through the government exception.49 
Governmental action pursuant to environmental laws consistently 
has been held by the courts to be within the § 362(b)(4) & (5) govern-
mental exception to the stay, thus allowing Agencies to pursue actions 
to determine a debtor's environmental liability but not to receive any 
compensation. 50 Relying on the legislative history of the provision,51 
the courts reason that, among other purposes, the § 362(b)(4) exemp-
tion was designed to combat the risk that bankruptcy court would 
become a sanctuary for environmental wrongdoers.52 Courts, how-
49 See City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting collection of a 
money judgment would be stayed); Word v. Commerce Oil (In re Commerce Oil), 847 F.2d 291, 
296 (6th Cir. 1988) (Tennessee Water Quality Control Board may only fix civil liability against 
debtor not enforce judgment); United States v. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 207 (EPA action to recover 
hazardous waste clean-up costs are exempt from automatic stay only up to and including entry 
of a monetary judgment); Brock v. Morysville Body Works, 829 F.2d 383, 389 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(OSHA citation could not be enforced against debtor to the extent it required debtor to pay 
penalty for past safety and health violations); United States v. Standard Metals, 49 B.R. 623 (D. 
Colo. 1985) (noting action seeking enforcement of money judgment for violations of Clean Water 
Act would be stayed); United States v. ILCO, 48 B.R. 1016, 1024 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (noting civil 
penalties would be stayed). 
50 See City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1024 (governmental actions to recover costs 
expended in response to completed environmental violations are not stayed by the violator's 
filing for bankruptcy); In re Commerce Oil, 847 F.2d at 296 (Tennessee Water Quality Control 
Board proceeding to fix civil liability against debtor was within police power exception to 
automatic stay in bankruptcy); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d at 209-10 (EPA action to 
recover hazardous waste clean-up costs was exempt from automatic stay up to and including 
entry ofa monetary judgment); In re Commonwealth Oil Ref., 805 F.2d at 1184--86 (EPA actions 
to require debtor hazardous waste facility to comply with federal and state environmental laws 
was exempted from stay by § 362(b)(4)); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 
267, 274 (3d Cir. 1984) (actions taken by commonwealth to obtain an injunction against debtor 
to correct environmental violation was within governmental exception to automatic stay); 
Cournoyer v. Town of Lincoln, 790 F.2d 971, 977 (1st Cir. 1986) (town's proposed removal of 
automotive parts and scrap metal from salvage yard maintained by debtor in violation of local 
zoning law would not be stayed); United States v. ILCO, 48 B.R. 1016, 1023 (N.D. Ala. 1985) 
(automatic stay does not apply to actions by state to fix liability for debtor's civil violations of 
state and federal environmental laws); United States v. Standard Metals, 49 B.R. 623, 624 (D. 
Colo. 1985) (action seeking entry of money judgment for violations of Clean Water Act not 
stayed). 
51 "Thus where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, 
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or 
attempting to fix damages for violation of such law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under 
the automatic stay." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299 (emphasis added). 
52 United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d at 207 (EPA action to recover hazardous waste 
clean-up costs was exempt from automatic stay up to and including entry of a monetary 
judgment). See City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1024 (governmental actions to recover 
costs expended in response to completed environmental violations was not stayed by the 
violator's filing for bankruptcy); In re Commerce Oil, 847 F.2d at 296 (Tennessee Water Quality 
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ever, also have held that enforcement of civil environmental actions, 
including reimbursement actions, remediation orders, and fines, are 
stayed as money judgments under § 362(b)(5).53 
Fines and cost reimbursement actions are clearly money judg-
ments, but it is less clear whether remediation orders qualify as 
money judgments as well. The Code is silent on whether affirmative 
injunctive-type orders qualify as money judgments54 and the legisla-
tive history is unclear on the issue.55 Courts holding that remediation 
orders should not be stayed as money judgments rely on standards 
established by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in Penn Terra Limited v. Department of Environmental Re-
sources.56 In Penn Terra, the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources (DER) obtained a consent decree requiring Penn 
Control Board proceeding to fix civil liability against debtor was within police power exception 
to automatic stay in bankruptcy); In re Commonwealth Oil Ref., 805 F.2d at 1184-86 (EPA 
actions to require debtor hazardous waste facility to comply with federal and state environ-
mental laws was exempted from stay by § 362(b)(4»; Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274 (actions taken 
by commonwealth to obtain an injunction against debtor to correct environmental violation was 
within governmental exception to automatic stay); In re Lenz Oil Serv., 65 B.R. 292, 294 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1986) (automatic stay does not prohibit regulatory action seeking injunctions and fixing 
of fines and penalties); United States v. ILCO, 48 B.R. at 1023 (automatic stay does not apply 
to actions by state to fix liability for debtor's civil violations of state and federal environmental 
laws); United States v. Standard Metals, 49 B.R. at 625 (action seeking entry of money judgment 
for violations of Clean Water Act was not stayed). 
63 See City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1024 (noting collection of money judgment would 
be stayed); In re Commerce Oil, 847 F.2d at 296 (Tennessee Water Quality Control Board may 
only fix civil liability against debtor not enforce judgment); United States v. Nicolet, 857 F2d 
at 207 (EPA action to recover hazardous waste clean-up costs was exempt from automatic stay 
only up to and including entry of a monetary judgment); Brock v. Morysville Body Works, 829 
F.2d at 389 (OSHA citation could not be enforced against debtor to the extent it required debtor 
to pay penalty for past safety and health violations); United States v. Standard Metals, 49 B.R. 
at 625 (noting action seeking enforcement of money judgment for violations of Clean Water Act 
would be stayed); United States v. ILCO, 48 B.R. at 1024 (noting civil penalties would be stayed). 
54 United States v. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 208. 
65 The legislative history states that "[p]aragraph (5) makes clear that the exception extends 
to permit an injunction and enforcement of an injunction, and to permit the entry of a money 
judgment, but does not permit enforcement of a money judgment." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299. 
56 733 F.2d at 274. See Brock v. Morysville Body Works, 829 F.2d at 388 (prospective orders 
to abate future violations of OSHA not stayed); United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 
818 F.2d 1077, 1086-87 (3d Cir.) (bankruptcy no bar to prospective enforcement of Clean Water 
Act), em. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); In re Commonwealth Oil Ref., 805 F.2d at 1186 (EPA's 
postpetition administrative order directing debtor to obtain permit and submit closure plans for 
its land disposal facilities in compliance with state and federal environmental law not stayed); 
Walsh v. West Virginia (In re Security Gas & Oil), 70 B.R. 786, 790--91 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(W.Va postpetition order directing debtor to plug and regrade oil and gas wells abandoned 
prepetition not stayed); United States v. Gregory & Sons, 58 B.R. 590, 592 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (state 
postpetition order directing debtor to perform reclamation work at leased mine site abandoned 
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Terra to reclaim certain subsurface coal mines pursuant to state law. 57 
Before Penn Terra complied with the consent decree, the mining 
company filed a petition under chapter 7 of the Code.58 The DER then 
sought to obtain a preliminary injunction against Penn Terra forcing 
the company to comply with the previous reclamation order, which 
required backfilling, controlling erosion, and sealing of a mine.59 
Stating that the exceptions to the automatic stay in § 362(b)(4) & 
(5) should be read broadly, and thus the term "money judgment" 
construed narrowly,SO the Third Circuit held that the injunction was 
not a money judgment and thus was enforceable as an exception to 
the stay.Sl The court reasoned whether or not an injunction requires 
payment or expenditure of money is not dispositive of whether an 
injunction is a money judgment.s2 Rather, the court stated, a money 
judgment generally specifies only the parties and a definite and cer-
tain sum that the defendant is obligated to pay; neither of which was 
present in this case.63 In fact, the court noted that the mere payment 
of money would not satisfy DER's order. Moreover, there was evi-
dence that the debtor could comply with the order by performing the 
mine reclamation work itself.s4 The court further noted that the pur-
pose of DER's order was to prevent future harm, and not to compen-
sate for past injuries, the type of remedy traditionally associated with 
a money judgment.65 To hold that the injunction was stayed as a 
money judgment, the court opined, would narrow the police and regu-
latory power exception to the automatic stay into "virtual nonex-
prepetition not stayed, emphasizing debtor's ability to perform work itself); In re Lenz Oil Serv., 
65 B.R. at 297 (stay did not prevent implementation of state's environmental clean-up orders to 
remediate old harm and prevent future harm); United States v. ILCO, 48 B.R. at 1024 (Alabama 
postpetition order directing debtor to remedy environmental hazards on leased off-site disposal 
grounds); In re Laurinburg Oil, 49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984) (stay does not prevent 
state from commencing civil injunction action against debtor to abate violations of state water 
pollution regulation). But see Thomas Solvent v. Kelley (In re Thomas Solvent), 44 B.R. 83, 88 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984) (court enjoined state from enforcing order to purify and protect 
contaminated water pursuant to state law); United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20310, 20312 (D.N.H. 1982) (waste clean-up injunction requiring 
debtor to expend substantial sums stayed). 
67 733 F.2d at 269. 
68Id. at 270. 
69Id. at 270 n.3. 
6°Id. at 273. 
61Id. at 272. 
62Id. at 277-78. 
63Id. at 275. 
64Id. at 278. 
65Id. at 277-78. 
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istence," because compliance with almost any type of injunction costs 
money.66 
b. Criminal Exception under § 362(b)(1) 
Another exception to the automatic stay available to Agencies un-
der § 362(b) is the criminal exception under § 362(b)(1).67 Similar to 
the government's civil exception to the stay under § 362(b)(4) & (5), 
this section provides that the automatic stay does not prevent "the 
commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding 
against the debtor."68 Unlike the civil exception, however, which is 
limited by the money judgment restriction under § 362(b)(5), the 
criminal exception is subject to no such restriction. Hence, the courts 
have interpreted § 362(b)(1) more broadly to mean that the automatic 
stay does not bar any criminal proceedings, including enforcement of 
a criminal judgment.69 The court's reasoning is supported by the leg-
islative history of § 362(b)(1): "[t]he bankruptcy laws are not a haven 
for criminal offenders, but are designed to give relief from financial 
over-extension. Thus, criminal actions and proceedings may proceed 
in spite of bankruptcy."7o 
The seminal case on the scope of the criminal exception to the stay 
is United States v. Troxler Hosiery.71 In Troxler, criminal contempt 
proceedings were brought against the defendant company as a result 
of an unlawful sale of sleepwear garments that had been treated with 
66 Id. Other courts addressing this issue have noted that, technically, even if the remediation 
order is not stayed by § 362(a)(I) or (2), any payment necessary to comply with the order would 
still need to be approved by the bankruptcy court under § 362(a)(3) of the Code, which enjoins 
"any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or to exercise control over property of 
the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988). See, e.g., In re Professional Sales, 56 B.R. 753, 763 n.6 
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (noting that sections 362(b)(4) & (5) do not provide an exception to § 362(a)(3)). 
But see Cournoyer v. Town of Lincoln, 790 F.2d 971, 977 (1st Cir. 1986) (town's removal and sale 
of debtor's scrap metal stored in violation of local zoning law not stayed under § 362(a)(3) where 
town had no pecuniary interest in debtor's property and no alternative measure was available 
to abate debtor's long-standing violation); In re Beker, 57 B.R. 611, 626 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1986) 
(holding 362(b)(4) exception to the stay applies to 362(a)(3) as well). See also Mirsky, supra note 
35, at 638-'39. 
67 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
6B Id. 
69 See United States v. 'froxler Hosiery, 41 B.R. 457 (Bankr. N.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd, 796 F.2d 
723 (4th Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987); 134 Baker St. v. State of Georgia, 47 B.R. 
379 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re Anoai, 61 B.R. 918 (Bankr. D. Ct. 1986). But see In re 
Landstrom, 55 B.R. 390 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985). 
70 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6299. See also 'froxler Hosiery, 41 B.R. at 461; Patten & Puetz, supra note 35, at 237. 
7141 B.R. 457 (D.N.C. 1984). 
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hazardous substances.72 The court entered a judgment for a criminal 
fine and costs totalling $82,733.48.73 The defendant company later filed 
a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.74 In an effort to collect the criminal 
judgment claim, the government made a motion for relief from the 
automatic stay based on § 362(b)(1) that was denied by the bank-
ruptcy court.75 The District Court for the District of North Carolina, 
however, reversed the bankruptcy court's decision on appeal, reason-
ing that criminal contempt proceedings differ from actions by govern-
mental units enforcing police or regulatory powers pertaining to the 
public health, safety, and welfare.76 The court stated that prosecution 
of a criminal case is not aimed at obtaining a pecuniary advantage; it 
is designed to punish offenders of the criminal law and to deter 
others.77 The court reasoned that if Congress intended the civil police 
power exception in § 362(b)(4) & (5) to include enforcement of criminal 
laws, then § 362(b)(1) would be surplusage.78 The court went on to 
hold that § 362(b)(1) applies to all stays enumerated in § 362(a) and is 
broad enough to include governmental suits to enforce criminal judg-
ments through pecuniary collection means.79 
As with the civil enforcement exception, the fact that the proceed-
ing is criminal does not indicate immediately that the exception is 
applicable.so If the court determines that the criminal proceeding is 
actually an attempt to collect a prepetition claim unrelated to criminal 
penalties, such as a restitution action, the court may enjoin the ac-
tion.81 These disguised collection actions have arisen most often in 
"bad check" prosecutions where the state will dismiss the criminal 
prosecution upon payment of the check.82 
Interestingly, there are no environmental cases testing the 
72Id. at 458. 
73Id. at 459. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77Id. 
78Id. at 462. 
79Id. at 461. See Patten & Puetz, supra note 35, at 237. 
80 For an excellent discussion of the criminal exception, see Patten & Puetz, supra note 35, at 
238. 
81 See, e.g., In re Van Riper, 25 B.R. 972, 978 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982). See also Patten & Puetz, 
supra note 35, at 238. 
82 See, e.g., In re Butler, 74 B.R. 106, 107 (W.D. Mo. 1985). See also Patten & Puetz, supra note 
35, at 236 (arguing that even if reimbursement for response costs is viewed as a form of 
restitution, the breach of the public order by the parties responsible for the contamination is a 
matter which is independent of such restitution and will probably not be stayed by a bankruptcy 
filing). 
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§ 362(b)(1) criminal exception to the stay.83 This lack of case law is 
most likely due to the reluctance of Agencies to pursue criminal 
claims. Although most environmental statutes include criminal pen-
alty provisions, Agencies are reluctant to pursue criminal claims due 
to the higher burden of proof required for criminal actions versus civil 
actions.84 
c. Discretionary Stay Under 11 U.S.C. § 105 
Even if a civil or criminal Agency proceeding is exempted from the 
automatic stay under § 362(b) of the Code, a bankruptcy court still 
has the discretion to enjoin the action pursuant to § 105(a) of the 
Code.85 This provision allows the bankruptcy court to "issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of [the Code]."86 Although § 105(a) provides the courts with 
broad injunction power, courts have exercised this power cautiously, 
particularly in the area of environmentallaw.87 Section 105(a) has been 
described as a last resort available to a debtor to halt a governmental 
proceeding that otherwise has a valid purpose.88 The courts reason 
that § 105 should only be used in extraordinary circumstances to 
prevent injury or correct errors and not to create rights not otherwise 
stipulated under applicable laws.89 
In determining whether to enjoin an environmental clean-up order 
83 Id.; Salerno, supra note 27, at 271. 
84 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 333-41 (1992). 
The authors argue that the major difficulty with criminal actions in environmental law is the 
higher burden of proof. As a criminal cause of action, the agency must prove the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which can require substantial evidence in environmental cases. 
In addition, many of the criminal provisions require proof of some sort of criminal intent or 
Imowledge on the part of the defendant. In contrast, the civil burden of proof requires only a 
preponderance of the evidence and any showing of knowledge is far less stringent. Furthermore, 
civil penalties, including remediation orders, response cost reimbursement actions and civil 
fines, usually prove amply severe. Given this difficulty with environmental criminal law, its 
usefulness has been argued to be largely symbolic, primarily used as a leverage tool by the 
prosecution to encourage defendants to plead guilty to civil charges so as to avoid possible jail 
time. Id. 
85 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988); Commonwealth Oil Ref. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (In re 
Commonwealth Oil Ref.), 805 F.2d 1175, 1188 (5th Cir. 1986), cm. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). 
86 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). 
87 E.g., In re Commonwealth Oil Ref., 805 F.2d at 1188; Johnson v. First Nat. Bank of 
Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). 
88 Murray Tabb, Competing Policies in Bankrnptcy: The Governmental Exceptions to the 
Automatic Stay, 21 TuLSA L.J. 183, 195-96 (1985). 
89 See Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Professional 
Sales, 56 B.R. 753, 764 (N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Wood, 33 B.R. 320, 323 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983). 
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under § 105, the bankruptcy courts weigh the state's interest in pro-
tectingthe public health and welfare against the policies of the Code.90 
While the legislative history of § 105 makes it clear that the stay 
should be granted only under the usual rules for the issuance of an 
injunction,91 courts have considered a myriad of issues in their balanc-
ing efforts.92 
So, while the Code provides government exceptions set forth in 
§ 362(b) and discretionary power in § 105, the automatic stay under 
§ 362(a) usually acts to stay all Agency enforcement efforts. Agencies 
are thus forced to pursue payment of their claims against debtors in 
bankruptcy's distribution process. 
2. Payment of Claims 
a. llnsecured ClaitnS 
One of the primary objectives of the bankruptcy proceeding is to 
distribute equitably the property of the estate, comprised of the 
debtor's unencumbered assets, to the debtor's prepetition unsecured 
creditors based on a priority distribution scheme.93 The Code's distri-
bution scheme divides holders of unsecured claims, claims not guar-
anteed by any lien in the debtor's property, into priority classes.94 The 
vast majority of unsecured claimants are classified as general unse-
cured creditors, the lowest priority level.95 Unless otherwise agreed 
to by the unsecured creditors, each priority level must be paid in full 
before moving down to pay the next priority level.96 This priority 
payment process continues until the estate's unencumbered assets are 
exhausted, with the remaining funds distributed on a pro-rata basis 
to the lowest priority level reached.97 
90 In re Commonwealth Oil Ref., 805 F.2d at 1188; In re Delaware River Stevedores, 129 B.R. 
38, 41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); Walsh v. West Virginia (In re Security Gas & Oil), 70 B.R. 786, 
796 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). 
91 Tabb, supra note 88, at 195-96. 
92 In re Security Gas & Oil, 70 B.R. at 796. 
93 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991); 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 34--35 (1986). 
94 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). 
95Id. 
96 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726, 1129 (1988). 
97 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726, 1123, 1129 (1988). Unless otherwise agreed to, in order to be confir-
med, a chapter 11 reorganization plan must provide the creditors with satisfaction equivalent 
to at least what the creditor would have received under a chapter 7 liquidation. § 1129(a)(9). 
This requirement means that all of the priority claims listed in § 507(a)(1)-(6) must be paid in 
cash in full at the date of the confirmation of the plan or on a deferred basis. Otherwise the 
reorganization will be converted to a chapter 7 liquidation. 
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b. Secured Claims 
The debtor's secured creditors, holders of valid security interests 
in the debtor's property,98 are not subject to this priority distribution 
scheme.99 Rather, the secured creditors are entitled to the value of 
their interest in property or adequate protectionlOO of that interest 
before the unsecured creditors are paid.1Ot The creditors' secured 
claims, however, are limited to the value of their interest in the 
secured property, with the remaining unsatisfied portion of the credi-
tors' claims becoming unsecured and subject to the Code's distribu-
tion schemeYJ2 
c. Environmental Claims 
The Code's priority scheme is silent regarding government envi-
ronmental claimsYl3 An Agency claim arising from prepetition ac-
tions-once stayed as a money judgment-is usually relegated to 
general unsecured priority status, the lowest priority position in the 
Code's priority scheme.104 Generally, there are insufficient funds to 
satisfy claims so low on the priority list.105 Moreover, even if there are 
sufficient funds to pay some amount to the general unsecured claims, 
98 A secured creditor's loan is secured by a valid lien on the debtor's property of a value equal 
to the debtor's interest in the property. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The lien creditor's property interest 
can arise upon the debtor's default pursuant to a contractual agreement between the creditor 
and the debtor. Otherwise, the lien creditor can acquire its property interest upon default by 
means of the judicial process and without the debtor's consent. In most states, such secured 
transactions are governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C. See NIMMER & HILLINGER, supra note 
37, at 10-18. 
99 Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886) (bankruptcy proceeding does not affect in rem 
rights); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6317 
("The bankruptcy discharge will not prevent enforcement of valid liens."). 
100 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d) & 361 (1988). 
101 Secured interests are subject to the article 9 priority system. U.C.C. §§ 9-201 & 301(1)(b). 
102 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). Subordinate claims unsatisfied by the secured property become 
unsecured claims. 
103 See In re Pierce Coal and Constr., 65 B.R. 521, 530 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). 
104 See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1985); Burlington 
N.R.R. v. Dant & Russell (In re Dant & Russell), 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988); Walsh v. West 
Virginia (In re Security Gas & Oil), 70 B.R. 786, 795 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). 
There is an exception for civil and criminal fines, which have slightly higher priority in chapter 
7 liquidations. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988). See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 n.5 (1985). 
105 See, e.g., In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. 278, 281 nA (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) ("EPA's 
argument for reimbursement as a general unsecured creditor for costs attributable to the ... 
spill is academic; there are no funds in the estate to pay general unsecured creditors) (emphasis 
added); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005 (2d Cir. 1991); 
In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397, 409 (N.D. Tex. 1992); In re Hudson Oil, 100 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. 
D. Kan. 1989); In re Kaiser Steel, 87 B.R. 662, 665 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re Security Gas & 
Oil, 70 B.R. at 795 n.6. 
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the pro-rata distribution often results in an Agency receiving only a 
few cents on the dollarYl6 Furthermore, Agency claims are limited to 
incurred costs. Under the Code, unincurred clean-up costs may be 
disallowed altogether as contingent claimsYJ7 Thus, Agency reim-
bursement claims for prepetition remediation costs have little prob-
ability of receiving sufficient payment from the distribution of the 
debtor's available assetsY~ 
d. Tax Claims 
Some governmental claims do receive priority treatment under the 
Code, particularly tax claimsYl9 Tax claims are given seventh priority 
in the Code's distribution schemeYo Moreover, a chapter 11 reorgani-
zation plan must provide for the full payment of tax claims in deferred 
cash payments within six years.1l1 Environmental claims, however, do 
not qualify for tax priority.ll2 
3. Discharge 
The remaining unsecured claims not satisfied under the Code's 
priority distribution scheme are usually discharged upon completion 
of the bankruptcy proceeding.ll3 The discharge voids all debts114 that 
arose prepetition115 without regard to whether the debts were filed 
with the bankruptcy court as claimsp6 Furthermore, the discharge 
106 See In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 B.R. 918, 924 n.9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1983) ("The costs of environmental study and resultant cleanup would, and I so found, have been 
entitled to unsecured status on the bankruptcy proceeding. Those astronomical costs as well as 
the ever-present administration expenses, would have resulted in a few pennies on a dollar."); 
Claar, supra note 5, at 33. 
w711 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(B) (1988); In re Charter Co., 862 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir. 1989). The 
court disallowed contingent claims, stating that § 502(e)(1) encourages expeditious cleanup and 
liquidation of contingent claims because only non-contingent claims are eligible to seek contri-
bution from a debtor's estate. Id. 
!OJId. 
109 For a full discussion of tax claims in bankruptcy, see Claar, supra note 5. 
110 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988). 
11111 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988). 
112 Claar, supra note 5. 
113 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1141, 727 (1988). See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 274. 
11411 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (defining debt broadly as a liability on a claim). 
115 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 & 1141 (1988). Technically, the chapter 11 discharge also discharges any 
claim that arose during the pendency period, the postpetition period before the confirmation of 
the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1988). 
116 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 & 1141 (1988). The only significant exception is under § 525(a)(3) of the 
Code, which provides that debts of unlisted or unscheduled creditors are not discharged unless 
the creditor has notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to file a timely proof 
of claim. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)(3). 
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acts as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of 
any action by any creditor with an unsatisfied claim that arose prior 
to the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings.ll7 The discharge 
fulfills the "fresh start" goal of bankruptcy. us The courts interpret 
claims subject to discharge broadly,U9 applying the discharge provi-
sion to most creditors' claims, including government claims.1ID 
Significantly, the fresh start is not absolute. A corporate debtor is 
only entitled to the discharge of its debts if it is reorganizing under 
chapter 11, rather than liquidating under chapter 7 of the Code.12l 
However, the absence of a discharge under chapter 7 for corporate 
debtors does not have a significant impact on the creditors' ability to 
collect from the liquidating corporate debtor because, typically, any 
further attempts at collection from a liquidated, defunct corporation 
are fruitless.122 
Another exception to the fresh start resulting from the discharge 
is that only the personal liability of the debtor is discharged. Thus, 
claims secured by property of the debtor survive the bankruptcy 
proceeding.l~ Consequently, the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding does 
not threaten secured claims against the debtor. 
Finally, the discharge is also subject to certain public policy excep-
tions, listed in § 523(a) of the Code.l24 The § 523(a) public policy ex-
ceptions, however, only apply to individual debtors and not corpora-
tions.125 Thus, the exception would have little relevance to corporate 
debtors facing environmental claims. 
11711 u.s.c. § 524(a) (1988). 
118 See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1902); Claar, supra note 5, at 30. 
119 "[T]he bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or 
contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case." H.R. REP. No. 95--595, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 
U.S. at 278; Patten & Puetz, supra note 35, at 228. 
120 Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 102 (1989). 
12111 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1141, 727 (1988). 
122 See Thomas Solvent v. Kelley (In re Thomas Solvent), 44 B.R. 83, 87 (noting no need for 
chapter 7 corporate discharge because debtor ''is but a cadaver"); United States v. Troxler 
Hosiery, 41 B.R. 457, 462 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (noting same), aff'd, 796 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1986), eert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987). 
123 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988). See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886) (bankruptcy does 
not affect in rem rights); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6317 ("The bankruptcy discharge will not prevent enforcement of valid 
liens."). 
124 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining "claim") (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
125 Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding § 523(a) only 
applies to individual debtors). 
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a. Environmental Cost Reimbursement and Fines 
Courts have held that environmental claims arising prepetition, 
including reimbursement actions and fines, are subject to the dis-
charge.l~ The most important question in this context is when does 
the environmental claim arise. In order to maximize the scope of the 
discharge and to provide the "broadest possible relief,"IZ7 courts look 
to the earliest reasonable date upon which an environmental claim 
may arise.l28 Courts reason that while non-bankruptcy law governs 
the existence of a claim under the Code, it is not dispositive of the 
time at which a claim arises in bankruptcy.129 Thus, for purposes of 
bankruptcy law, environmental claims arise at the time when the 
contamination or violation occurred, despite the fact that there might 
be a continuing violation or substantial unincurred costS.130 
la; See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 (1985); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 
1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (EPA's response cost claims were prepetition "claims" dischargeable in 
bankruptcy, regardless of when such costs were incurred, so long as such costs concerned release 
or threatened release of hazardous waste that occurred prepetition); In re N at'l Gypsum, 139 
B.R. 397, 409 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (future response and natural resource damage costs based on 
prepetition.conduct that can be fairly contemplated by the parties at time of debtor's bankruptcy 
are discharged as claims under the Code); In re Hudson Oil, 100 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
1989) (indemnification claim arising from debtor-lessee's violation of state environmental law 
prior to bankruptcy filing was ''prepetition claim" notwithstanding that lessor did not learn of 
contamination to property until post-petition); In re Kaiser Steel, 87 B.R. 662, 665 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 1988) (debtor's prepetition activities in violation of environmental laws including failure 
to reclaim site were dischargeable as claims). 
Although government tax claims and fines are nondischargeable in bankruptcy, it does not 
apply to corporate debtors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(I) & (7) (1988). See In re Wisconsin Barge Lines, 
91 B.R. 65, 67-68 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (environmental fines against corporation arising from 
conduct occurring prepetition were dischargeable as "claims"); Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shad co, 
Inc., 762 F.2d at 670; Salerno, supra note 27, at 271. 
li17H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 5808 ("By this broadest possible definition ... the bill contemplates that all legal obliga-
tions of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the 
bankruptcy case."). 
128 See In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 699-700 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). In this way the courts are 
able to bring contingent future response costs within the ambit of the discharge. See In re 
Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005; In re N at'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 405-06. The court merely 
requires a "speedy and rough" estimation of the environmental claims under § 502(c). In re 
Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005. The CERCLA ban under § 113(h) of pre-enforcement 
judicial review, forbidding federal courts from accepting jurisdiction over an action that inter-
feres with normal CERCLA enforcement proceedings, does not prevent this estimation require-
ment. In re Natl Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 406. 
129 See In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 405. 
Ill) See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005 (EPA's response cost claims were prepetition 
"claims" dischargeable in bankruptcy, regardless of when such costs were incurred, so long as 
such costs concerned release or threatened release of hazardous waste that occurred prepeti-
1993] CIRCLE K 165 
Some courts have slightly limited this broad interpretation of when 
an environmental claim arises, staying only claims that the parties 
could have fairly contemplated at the time of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy.131 The courts reason that the Agencies should not be penalized 
for not acting sooner when they had no knowledge of the contamina-
tion.132 
b. Environmental Remediation Orders 
While fines and cost reimbursement claims are clearly discharge-
able under the Code, it is not as clear whether injunction remedies, 
such as clean-up orders, are dischargeable as well.133 Generally, these 
injunctions are discharged as claims to the extent the debtor would 
be required to spend funds to fulfill the obligation.134 
tion); In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 409 (future response and natural resource damage costs 
based on prepetition conduct that can be fairly contemplated by the parties at time of debtor's 
bankruptcy are discharged as claims under the Code); Jensen v. Cal. Dept. of Health Servs. (In 
re Jensen), 127 B.R. 27, 33 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (environmental claim arose at the time of actual 
or threatened release of hazardous waste); In re Hudson Oil, 100 B.R. at 77 (indemnification 
claim arising from debtor-lessee's violation of state environmental law prior to bankruptcy filing 
was "prepetition claim" notwithstanding that lessor did not learn of contamination to property 
until post-petition); In re Wisconsin Barge Lines, 91 B.R. at 67-68 (environmental fines against 
corporation arising from conduct occurring prepetition were dischargeable as "claims"); In re 
Kaiser Steel, 87 B.R. at 665 (debtor's prepetition activities in violation of environmental laws 
including failure to reclaim site were dischargeable as claims). But see In re Frenville, 774 F.2d 
332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985) (often-criticized opinion holding, for the 
purposes of automatic stay, claim for indemnification or contribution did not arise until cause of 
action had accrued under state law). 
131 See, e.g., In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407 (debtor could discharge potential liability for 
future CERCLA response costs only to extent such claims could be fairly contemplated by 
parties as of the commencement of the case); American Intern, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 146 B.R. 
391, 394 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (prepetition release of hazardous waste alone does not give rise to 
CERCLA claim; disposition of this issue rests on determination of when CERCLA claimant 
had sufficient knowledge of claim); Sylvester Bros. Dev. v. Burlington N.R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 
652-53 (D. Minn. 1991) (debtor's CERCLA liability not discharged even though state failed to 
file claim and was on notice that it was a creditor in case, because state did not know that debtor 
was PRP in time to file); In re Allegheny Int., 126 B.R. 919, 926 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (CERCLA cost 
recovery claim does not arise until claimant incurs costs, however, once costs are incurred, a 
claim exists for all costs, future and past, incurred at the site); United States v. Union Scrap 
Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 834-37 (D. Minn. 1990) (court refused to discharge environmental 
claims arising post-bankruptcy based on post-petition conduct because EPA was unaware that 
debtor was PRP at site not owned by debtor). See also In re Frenville, 774 F.2d at 337 (holding 
that a claim arises when the claimant's cause of action has accrued under state law). 
132 See In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407. 
133 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
134 See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1009 (EPA's injunction remedy constituted 
dischargeable claim to extent it did "no more than impose an obligation entirely as an alternative 
to a payment right"); United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1988) (chapter 7 
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Courts which allow the discharge of environmental claims base 
their decision on the Supreme Court holding in Ohio v. Kovacs, where 
the Court held that environmental orders are claims under § 101(5) 
of the Code and thus are dischargeable.l35 In Kovacs, the state of Ohio 
obtained an injunction ordering William Kovacs, chief executive 
officer of Chem-Dyne Corporation, to clean up a hazardous waste 
disposal site.l36 When Kovacs failed to comply with the injunction, the 
state court appointed a receiver to take control of the site and to seize 
his assets to pay for the site cleanup.137 Kovacs subsequently filed for 
personal bankruptcy before the state completed the cleanup.l36 The 
state sought to have Kovacs' obligation to clean up the site declared 
non-dischargeable in bankruptcy and to enjoin the bankruptcy trus-
tee from obtaining any assets in Kovacs' estate from the state re-
ceiver.l39 
The bankruptcy court ruled against the state, as did the District 
Court for the Southern District of OhiO.140 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the state es-
sentially sought from the respondent only a monetary payment and 
that such a required payment was a liability on a claim that was 
dischargeable under the Code.141 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
Appellate Court decision, holding that the clean-up injunction had 
been converted into a monetary obligation and, as such, was dischar-
geable as a claim.l42 The Court reasoned that when the state had 
appointed the receiver, it had dispossessed Kovacs of his authority 
over the site and his assets. Therefore, the only performance sought 
from Kovacs was the payment of money.l43 
debtor's obligation to reclaim mine discharged to the extent it required debtor to spend money, 
but debtor must comply with portion of order not requiring expenditure of funds); In re 
Microfab, 105 B.R. 161, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (where chapter 7 trustee may only fulfill 
remediation order on inoperative site contaminated prepetition by paying contractor, order 
would be dischargeable as money judgment); United States v. Robinson (In re Robinson), 46 
B.R. 136, 139 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.) (injunction ordering debtor that illegally filled in wetland area 
to restore the wetland to its prior condition held to be dischargeable because the restoration 
would require expenditure of money), rev'd on other grounds, 55 B.R. 355 (M.D. Fla. 1985). 
136 469 U.S. 274, 284 (1985). 
136 Id. at 276. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 277. 
140 In re Kovacs, 29 B.R. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
141 In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983). 
142 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283. 
143 Id. 
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In a footnote, the Court in Kovacs distinguished Penn Terral44 as 
an action to enforce regulatory statutes rather than enforcement of a 
money judgment against the debtor.145 Courts that rely on Kovacs to 
discharge injunctions conclude that, although under Penn Terra the 
injunction action would not be stayed during the proceeding, under 
Kovacs the clean-up obligation would be dischargeable at the end of 
the proceeding.l46 
Other courts, however, have distinguished Kovacs on its facts. 
These courts draw a distinction between affirmative orders to clean 
up, such as the order stayed in Kovacs, and negative orders to cease 
polluting.147 The courts reason that the appointment of a receiver in 
Kovacs left the debtor no alternative method of compliance other than 
payment, thus the clean-up order was rightly dischargeable.148 The 
courts distinguish the situation in Kovacs, however, from one where 
no alternative right to payment exists, such as an order to stop or 
ameliorate ongoing pollution.l49 In holding these negative orders non-
dischargeable, the courts rely on the Kovacs Court's statement that 
the owner "may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the 
State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions."I50 
144 Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). 
146Id. at 283 n.ll. Previously, the court in Penn Terra had distinguished the Sixth Circuit 
opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kovacs on similar grounds, stating that the cases 
dealt with "different sections of the Code." Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 277 n.ll. 
146 See, e.g., In re Microfab, 105 B.R. 161, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). 
147 See, e.g., In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1992) (CERCLA 
liability based on chapter 11 debtor's current ownership of hazardous waste site created clainI 
running with land, not dependent on debtor's actions before or during reorganization, and 
liability survived reorganization); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1009 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(order obtained by EPA against debtor, that to any extent ends or ameliorates continued 
pollution, was not dischargeable claim); United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147, 150--51 (6th Cir. 
1988) (debtor must comply with portion of order not requiring expenditure of funds); Torwico 
Elec., Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection & Energy, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20465 at 7 (D.N.J. 
1992) (debtor's clean-up obligation was not discl1argeable unsecured clainI because intended to 
remedy both past and ongoing pollution), rev'g in part and vacating in part, In re Torwico Elec., 
131 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991); United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160, 164 (W.D. Pa. 1990) 
(obligations under cessation order, requiring operator of surface mine to obtain permit or to 
regrade and re-seed area were not discl1arged because order demanded performance not pay-
ment, and thus obligations were not clainIs), aff'd without opinion, 928 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1991). 
148 See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1008"'{)9 (court agreed that where injunction 
does no more than impose obligation entirely as alternative to right to payment then that order 
is dischargeable as clainI). 
149Id. 
150 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285. 
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c. Summary 
In short, the Code severely limits Agency opportunities to satisfy 
environmental claims against bankrupt corporate debtors, including 
fines, cost reimbursement claims, and remediation orders. The Code 
stays Agency collection efforts when the debtor files a bankruptcy 
petition. Then, it classifies Agency claims as general unsecured prior-
ity claims, and Agencies receive insufficient compensation. Finally, 
the Code authorizes the discharge of the unsatisfied Agency claims 
upon completion of the proceeding. 
III. THE AGENCIES GET TOUGH 
In response to the inconsistent and rather unsympathetic treat-
ment of environmental claims in bankruptcy, Agencies grew more 
creative and sophisticated in their approach to the Code. The Agen-
cies devised ingenious strategies to shoehorn environmental claims 
into higher priority classes in order to ensure compensation from 
debtors' assets. Agencies found particular success with state super-
lien statutes and some additional success with administrative expense 
priority.151 
A. Super lien Statutes 
In an effort to counter Agency claims that the Court's holding in 
Kovacs was hostile to enforcement of environmental law, Justice 
O'Connor noted, in her concurrence, that" ... a state may protect its 
interests in the enforcement of its environmental laws by giving 
clean-up judgments the status of statutory liens .... "152 
Over twenty states' statutes currently contain such environmental 
151 See Salerno, supra note 27, at 285; Claar, supra note 5, at 46; Cistulli, supra note 18, at 596; 
James N. Lawlor, Comment, Toxic Tug-Of-War: Environmental Cleanup Costs, Bankruptcy 
and the Administrative Expense Priority-Is It A Collision of Conflicting Policies or Just 
Plain Confusion?, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 832, 848 (1991). 
152 469 U.S. at 286. Similar reasoning has been used in other cases to justify holdings adverse 
to environmental laws. See Midlantic Nat. Bank v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 
517 (Renquist, J., dissenting) (states retain considerable latitude to ensure priority status of 
their clean-up claims), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986); Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Dant & 
Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell), 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kovacs, court held 
that it was not free to formulate its own rules of super- or sub-priorities within specifically 
enumerated class); In re Microfab, 105 B.R. at 168 n.21 (quoting Kovacs, court noted that 
denying administrative priority "does not necessarily set environmental authorities at a disad-
vantage"). 
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lien provisions,l53 as does CERCLA.154 Under these statutes, a lien 
generally arises to secure the costs that the Agency incurred cleaning 
up the debtor's contaminated land.155 Once the Agency files the lien, 
it usually attaches to the contaminated site being remediated, placing 
the state claim in the secured claimant group and thereby giving the 
Agency's claim priority over all unsecured claims.156 Furthermore, as 
a secured claim, the Agency lien may survive the debtor's bankruptcy 
unaffected by the discharge.157 
Statutory liens, however, are not a perfect solution for Agency 
collection woes resulting from bankrupt PRPs. Most lien statutes give 
the Agency's claim priority only over subsequent secured creditors 
but not over creditors with prior perfected security interests in the 
debtor's property.l58 The Agency lien, as a subordinate secured claim, 
will receive compensation only after the prior secured claims are fully 
satisfied by the proceeds of the secured property. A bankrupt debtor, 
in the course of its business, is likely to have granted many security 
liens in its property prior to the filing of the Agency lien. Therefore, 
the Agency claim will often receive insufficient compensation from the 
lien on the property. Upon liquidation of the property, the unsatisfied 
153 See ALASKA STAT. § 46.08.075 (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-417, 516 (Michie 
1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, para. 
1021.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 13--7-8.7-10.7 (West Supp. 1991); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 455B.396 (West 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400(23) (Baldwin Supp. 
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 
(West 1989 & Supp. 1992); MD. ENVlR. CODE ANN. § 7-266 (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, 
§ 13 (Supp. 1992); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.32(16a) (Callaghan Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 514.671-.676 (West 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10--720 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 147-B:2, :1O-b (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:K-9.3 (West 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3734.22 (Baldwin 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 466.205 (1992); P A. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.509 
(1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-209 (1992); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.194 
(West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1406 (Michie 1989). 
154 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988). Note that the status ofthe current CERCLA lien provision is 
unclear following the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Reardon v. United States, 947 
F.2d 1509, 1523-24 (1st Cir. 1991), where the court held that the CERCLA lien provision violates 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, requiring the EPA to provide notice and a 
hearing before imposing the lien. See Note, Environmental Law-Due Process-First Circuit 
Finds That CERCLA Lien Provision Violates Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1992). 
155 [d. 
156 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988). 
157 Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620--21 (1886) (bankruptcy proceeding doesn't affect in rem 
rights); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6317 
("The bankruptcy discharge will not prevent enforcement of valid liens."). See infra note 123 
and accompanying text. 
158 If another financier already had a prior perfected security interest in the particular prop-
erty, the state would only collect from secured property the value remaining after the prior 
financier had completely satisfied its debt. See U.C.C. §§ ~201 & ~301(1)(b). 
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remainder of the Agency's secured claim is relegated to general un-
secured status/59 which often results in little or no payment. 
In response to the lack of certain higher priority status under 
traditional statutory liens, some states currently authorize "super 
priority" environmental liens, referred to as superliensyj() These liens 
have super priority, meaning that upon filing by the Agency, the 
superlien becomes a first priority charge upon the debtor's property, 
superior even to prior perfected, consensual and nonconsensualliens 
and security interests.161 Superliens represent an attempt by states 
to place the Agencies' claims ahead of other secured claims in the 
Code's orderly presentation and prioritization of those claimsYi2 
Superliens, however, are not the ultimate solution for Agency col-
lection troubles arising out of bankruptcy either because, to be effec-
tive in bankruptcy, all statutory liens must adhere to certain restric-
tive requirements.l63 First, the liens must be levied prepetition or risk 
avoidance by the trustee.164 Under § 545(2), the trustee may avoid any 
statutory lien that is not perfected under the state law requirements 
before the bankruptcy petition is filed.165 If the lien is avoided under 
§ 545, it is relegated by the Code to general unsecured status, possibly 
precluding recovery.166 Second, not all costs are recoverable under the 
159 11 u.s.c. § 506 (1988). 
160 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2281 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 13 (Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :10-b (1990); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 58:1O-23.11f(f) (West 1991). See Richard L. Epling, Environmental Liens in 
Bankruptcy, 44 Bus. LAW. 85, 87 (1988). 
The CERCLA lien does not provide superlien status. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988). 
161 11 U.S.C. § 545(a) (1988). Epling, supra note 160, at 87. 
162 Douglas C. Ballantine, Note, Recovering Costs for Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites: 
An Examination of State Superlien Statutes, 63 IND. L.J. 571, 581 (1988); Epling, supra note 
160, at 87. See generally Lockett, supra note 18; Smith, supra note 35. 
A constitutional challenge to the broad reach of a superlien statute was rejected by the New 
Jersey Appellate Court in Kessler v. Tarrats, 476 A.2d 326, 331 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), 
where the court held that New Jersey's superlien statute was not in violation of the contracts 
or due process clauses of the Constitution, as long as the lien served a legitimate public purpose 
and was reasonable. See Epling, supra note 160, at 88--89. 
163 See Ballantine, supra note 162, at 581. 
164 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1988). Note, however, that there is no risk of violating the automatic 
stay. Section 362(b)(3) provides an exception to the stay for actions taken under § 546(b), which 
allows recording of liens taken pursuant to applicable law. See In re Microfab, 105 B.R. 152, 153 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (court held automatic stay did not apply to recording of environmental 
liens provided by state law). 
165 See Ballantine, supra note 162, at 581. Under § 546(b), however, a state could allow for 
retroactive filing, which might defeat the trustee's avoidance power. Epling, supra note 160, at 
92. 
166 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988). See Ballantine, supra note 162, at 581. 
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super priority lien. Most lien statutes cover only remediation costs, 
which excludes interest and penalties arising from the debtor's recal-
citrance.167 
Finally, the type of property to which the lien attaches may deter-
mine whether an Agency actually will recover its remediation ex-
pensesYiB Most lien statutes attach only to the contaminated prop-
erty.169 This may present a problem for an Agency because clean-up 
costs often exceed the value of the contaminated property.170 An 
Agency's remaining unsecured costs will languish on the bottom of 
the chain of priority, often resulting in no payment. 
Recognizing that the clean-up cost might exceed the waste site's 
value, some states have extended the reach of their superlien statutes 
beyond the contaminated site to all the PRP's real and personal 
property and revenues.l7l The liens have super priority, however, only 
as they apply to the realty, personalty, and business revenues of the 
contaminated site itself and not to the debtors' other assets that are 
unrelated to the site. l72 As to all the other attachable property or 
revenues, the liens have priority only over subsequent en cum-
brances.l73 
Therefore, while some superlien statutes allow Agencies to place a 
lien on other property of the debtor unrelated to the contaminated 
site, the superliens may not ultimately give Agency claims any more 
priority than if their claims were filed simply as general unsecured 
claims. 
B. Administrative Expense Priority 
Some Agencies with environmental claims against bankrupt PRPs 
have found tremendous success filing for administrative expense pri-
167 See Cheryl K. Clark, Due Process and the Enviranmental Lien: The Need for Legislative 
Reform, 20 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 203, 205 (1993); Ballantine, supra note 162, at 581. 
168 Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigatian, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1599 (1986). 
169 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
38, § 1371 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992). 
170 See Clark, supra note 167, at 205; Ballantine, supra note 162, at 581. 
171 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 13 (Supp. 
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :lO-b (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(t) (West 
1991). See Clark, supra note 167, at 205. 
172 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 13 (Supp. 
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :lO-b (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(t) (West 
1991). See Clark, supra note 167, at 205. 
173 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 13 (Supp. 
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :lO-b (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(t) (West 
1991). See Clark, supra note 167, at 205. 
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ority under § 503 of the Code.174 Administrative expense priority pro-
vides the highest possible priority available under the Code for unse-
cured creditors, qualifying claims to be paid in full, ahead of all other 
unsecured creditors.175 The rationale behind elevating certain ex-
penses to this high priority is to encourage third parties to continue 
to conduct business with the estate, in an effort to rehabilitate the 
debtor's business and preserve the estate's assets.l76 Without a guar-
antee of first priority, third parties, such as goods and service suppli-
ers, would not deal with a business in chapter 11 reorganization or 
chapter 7 liquidation, thereby greatly hindering administration of the 
estate.177 
Payment of administrative expense claims, however, can quickly 
deplete the debtor's assets reserved for prepetition unsecured credi-
17411 U.S.C. § 503 (1988). 
175 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 1129(a)(9) & 726(a)(1) (1988). 
The Code does not allow administrative claims to take priority over secured claims, however. 
See Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th 
Cir. 1988); In re Cascade Hydraulics & Utility Serv., 815 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1987); First W. 
Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Anderson, 252 F.2d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Synfax, 126 B.R. 30, 
34-35 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990); In re Corona Plastics, 99 B.R. 231, 236 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989); In re 
T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. 278, 287 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). 
Section 506(c) of the Code represents the only exception to the traditional rule that the costs 
of administering the bankruptcy estate may not be charged against secured creditors. 11 U .S.C. 
§ 506(c) (1988). Section 506 provides that the trustee may recover the reasonable and necessary 
costs of preserving collateral to the extent the lien holding secured creditor benefits from such 
actions. These claims have secured status and therefore payment is a super priority under the 
Code. Although the issue of standing is far from clear, a court has held that along with the 
trustee and the debtor in possession, the EPA has standing to seek a surcharge for clean-up 
costs. In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. at 288-89. Section 506(c) also requires, however, that 
costs incurred directly benefit the lien holder. Courts have consistently held that environmental 
clean-up costs do not qualify for surcharge priority because the secured lien holder is not 
properly benefitted in a direct and tangible way. See In re Cascade Hydraulics & Utility Serv., 
815 F.2d at 548 (lacking specific findings as to how administrative expense benefitted secured 
creditor, there was no basis in record for allowing payment of administrative expenses from 
proceeds of sale of secured creditor's collateral); In re Paris Ind., 80 B.R. 2, 5 (Bankr. D. Me. 
1987) (no basis existed to grant state of New York super priority lien for cost of cleaning up 
hazardous waste on debtor's real property, and thus, New York's claim did not displace bank's 
first security interest in proceeds of sale of debtor's personal property); In re T.P. Long Chems., 
45 B.R. at 287 (denied EP~s claim to proceeds of sale of property securing claim because no 
benefit to secured creditor). But see In re Better-Brite Plastics, 105 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wis. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 136 B.R. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (granting EPA and state 
administrative priority for clean-up claims over secured creditors). For a discussion of this issue, 
see Salerno, supra note 27, at 305. 
176 See In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d 1449, 1452-M (11th Cir. 1992); Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. 
Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell), 853 F.2d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 1988); Trustees of 
Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin's, 789 F.2d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Jartran Inc., 732 
F.2d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Mammoth Mart, 536 F.2d 950, 953 (1st Cir. 1976). See also 
Lawlor, supra note 151, at 837. 
177 See In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1452-54. 
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tors. Accordingly, under § 503(b), claimants must show that their 
claims are "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services ren-
dered after the commencement of the case .... "178 
Some courts have granted environmental clean-up costs adminis-
trative expense priority under § 503, but limit the opportunity gen-
erally to costs and concomitant fines incurred postpetition to clean up 
postpetition contamination.179 Courts have broad discretion to deter-
mine what qualifies as administrative expense priority,180 and the 
decisions in this area are inconsistent.181 
Generally, most courts require environmental claims to have a dis-
tinct postpetition character, allowing administrative priority only for 
the environmental costs both incurred postpetition and arising from 
postpetition contamination or violation.l82 Other courts, however, are 
178 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988). See Lawlor, supra note 151, at 836. 
179 See, e.g., In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1456; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1009 
(2d Cir. 1991); In re Wall 'lUbe & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d 118, 124 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Charles-
bank Laundry, 755 F.2d 200, 202-03 (1st Cir. 1985); In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397, 413 (N.D. 
Tex. 1992); In re Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. 656, 659 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1 (1st 
Cir. 1992); In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. 827, 830 (D. Kan. 1991); In re Kent Holland Die Casting 
& Plating, 125 B.R. 493, 500--01 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991); In re Better-Brite Plating, 105 B.R. 
at 917; In re FCX, 96 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); In re Vernon Sand & Gravel, 93 B.R. 
580, 582 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); In re Peerless Plating, 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1987); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 783 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987); In re Mowbray Eng'g, 67 B.R. 34, 
36 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986); In re Distrigas Corp., 66 B.R. 382, 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); In re 
Pierce Coal and Constr., 65 B.R. 521, 530 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986); In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 
B.R. at 289; In re Laurinburg Oil, 49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984); In re Vermont Real 
Estate Inv. Trust, 25 B.R. 804, 806 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982). See also Salerno, supra note 27, at 285. 
180 See In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 707; In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1452; In re Verco 
Indus., 20 B.R. 664 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). 
181 See LAWRENCE P. KING, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 503.03, at 503-17 - 503-18 (15th Ed. 
1991) ("A court might well conclude that there are to be allowed as administrative expenses 
clanns not necessarily precisely covered by the provisions of section 503(b) .... Further, what 
constitute actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving an estate might well be open 
to judicial construction."); Lawlor, supra note 151, at 837. 
182 See In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1461 (punitive and civil penalties assessed postpetition 
against chapter 11 debtor as punishment for environmental violations qualified as administrative 
expense priority only to the extent they were assessed as a consequence of postpetition opera-
tions); In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 709 (lessor not entitled to administrative priority for 
clean-up cost where conduct giving rise to clean-up costs occurred prepetition); Southern Ry. v. 
Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1985) (bankruptcy court has no authority to 
elevate prepetition unsecured claim to administrative priority claim); In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 
B.R. at 830 (only penalties assessed for postpetition misconduct or for misconduct that continued 
into postpetition, as opposed to continuing effects of prepetition misconduct, should be treated 
as administrative expense); In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. at 504 (allowed 
administrative priority only for damage caused by postpetition operation); In re Pierce Coal and 
Constr., 65 B.R. at 531 (damages caused by chapter 7 trustee operating bankruptcy estate 
postpetition were entitled to administrative priority). 
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less strict on this issue, holding that environmental claims have a 
sufficient postpetition character if the clean-up costs simply were 
incurred postpetition.1&l 
In order to be considered actual costs, courts usually require the 
Agency to bring a reimbursement action only after incurring the 
clean-up costS.184 The courts reason that allowing administrative pri-
ority without actual costs would be premature and speculative.185 This 
reasoning is consistent with CERCLA requirements that clean-up 
costs must be incurred before PRPs can bring reimbursement 
claims.186 Other courts, however, have accorded administrative prior-
ity to contingent future costS.187 
Most importantly, environmental cost reimbursement claims must 
also be "necessary" to "preserve" the estate in order to qualify for 
administrative expense priority under § 503.188 The Code is silent on 
whether environmental clean-up costs should qualify as necessary to 
preserve the estate, and the courts are divided.189 
1113 See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1009-10 (all clean-up costs assessed postpetition 
with respect to sites currently owned by debtor where there had been prepetition release or 
threatened release of hazardous wastes were entitled to administrative priority); In re Nat'l 
Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 413 (response costs incurred postpetition as a result of debtor's prepetition 
activity were entitled to administrative priority); In re Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. at 659 
(private action under CERCLA for reimbursement of postpetition costs arising from prepetition 
conduct awarded administrative priority, noting that cause of action under CERCLA did not 
arise until postpetition); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 783 (postpetition cleanup of prepetition 
environmental hazard by state agency constituted first priority expenditure); In re Distrigas 
Corp., 66 B.R. 382, 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (allowed administrative priority for reimburse-
ment of postpetition efforts to remedy toxic waste problems stemming from prepetition activ-
ity). See also Claar, supra note 5, at 48. 
184 See, e.g., In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991) (until expense is incurred 
in furtherance of a cleanup, award of administrative priority was premature); In re Kent Holland 
Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. at 497 (administrative priority for contribution claim by lessor 
for incurred clean-up costs disallowed where EPA action against lessor was still pending); In re 
Microfab, 105 B.R. 161, 169-70 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (commonwealth request for administrative 
status was premature where no funds had been expended and no reliable estimate was avail-
able). 
185 See In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. at 580; In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. 
at 497; In re Microfab, 105 B.R. at 169-70. 
186 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(i). See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D. N.J. 1983). 
187 See In re Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. at 659 (D. Mass. 1991) (past and future response 
costs incurred by entity that purchased real property from debtor in cleaning up hazardous 
waste on the property were entitled to administrative priority); In re FCX, 96 B.R. at 55 
(administrative priority granted to state's requested future clean-up costs where alleviating 
imminent and immediate threat to public safety; all other clean-up expenses were treated as 
general unsecured claims); In re Distrigas Corp., 66 B.R. 382, 387 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (noting 
in dicta that although state claim was contingent until funds expended, post bankruptcy cleanup 
was entitled to administrative priority). 
188 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988). 
189 Compare In re Wall Metal Prods. & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987) (awarded 
administrative priority for clean-up claims) with Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re 
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1. Necessary Costs 
In holding that clean-up costs and concomitant fines are necessary 
costs for preserving the estate, many courts rely on Midlantic Na-
tional Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion.1oo In Midlantic, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,l91 holding that 
a bankruptcy trustee could not abandon a debtor's contaminated prop-
erty in contravention of a state statute reasonably designed to protect 
the public health or safety from an imminent and identified hazard.1OO 
The Court's ruling directly conflicted with the trustee's explicit statu-
tory power under § 554 of the Code to abandon any burdensome 
property of the estate. 1m 
The effect of abandonment of property under § 554 is that owner-
ship and control are reinstated in the debtor with all rights and 
obligations the debtor had prepetition.194 The Midlantic Court rea-
soned that by abandoning the contaminated property, the trustee was 
imprudently releasing the property back to the insolvent debtor, who 
would be unable to facilitate cleanup. Thus, the Court concluded al-
lowing abandonment would ultimately burden the state agency with 
the responsibility for cleaning up the site.195 
Accordingly, the Midlantic Court held that the trustee could not 
Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 16-17 (4th Cir. 1988) (denied administrative priority for 
clean-up claims). 
19°474 U.S. 494, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986). See, e.g., In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 
1458-{j9; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1010; In re Wall Metal Prods. & Metal Prods., 831 
F.2d at 122; In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 413; In re Better-Brite Plating, 105 B.R. at 917; In 
re FCX, 96 B.R. at 54; In re Peerless Plating, 70 B.R. 943, 946-48 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In 
re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 781; In re Pierce Coal and Constr., 65 B.R. 521, 531 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 
1986) (dicta); In re Microfab, 105 B.R. at 169 (dicta). See also Claar, supra note 5, at 48-49. 
191 New York v. Quanta Resources (In re Quanta Resources), 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984). 
192474 U.S. at 507. 
193 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). See Claar, supra note 5, at 47. 
194 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 n.12 (1985); White v. Coon (In 
re Purco), 76 B.R. 523, 532 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Hunter, 76 B.R. 117, 118 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1987) (when property is abandoned, ''title reverts back to the debtor as if it had never been 
held by the trustee"); In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 B.R. 918, 923-24 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 1983). 
It is not clear under § 554 what the beneficial effect would be of abandoning contaminated 
property in a chapter 11 case. Apparently, the abandoned property that reverts to the debtor 
during the pendency period would become part of the reorganized debtor's postconfirmation 
property, along with the environmental liability. Moreover, due to successor liability, any at-
tempt to sell the property would not reduce the debtor's postconfirmation liability. See Ohio v. 
Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285; In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1147-48 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(notwithstanding discharge of preconfirmation environmental clean-up claim as to the debtor, 
the reorganized debtor could be held liable for all clean-up costs as current owner or operator 
of toxic waste site pursuant to CERCLA). 
195 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507. 
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abandon property without first complying with environmental laws 
"reasonably designed to protect the public health and safety from 
identified hazards."l!l6 In creating this "narrow" public policy excep-
tion to the trustee's abandonment power, the Court opined that "the 
Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an abandon-
ment without formulating conditions that will adequately protect the 
public's health and safety."197 Significantly, the Court qualified its hold-
ing in a footnote, stating that the exception to abandonment was to 
be construed narrowly and only applied in cases in which there had 
been a showing of an "imminent and identifiable harm."l!18 
The Midlantic Court supported its decision with 28 U.S.C. 
§ 959(b),199 although recognizing that the provision does not directly 
apply to abandonment.20o Section 959(b) requires that the trustee or 
debtor in possession manage and operate the property in accordance 
with state law.201 The purpose behind the § 959(b) requirement to 
comply with state law is to prevent a debtor from using federal 
bankruptcy protection to maintain its economic viability through vio-
lations of state laws, including environmentallaws.202 The Court rea-
soned that § 959(b) was not directly applicable in this case, however, 
because the provision applies only where the trustee is actually oper-
196 Id. 
1!17 Id. 
l!18 Id. at 507 n.9. In Midlantic, the Court held that the sites-waste oil facilities---clearly posed 
a very serious threat to the public, because the facilities contained approximately 470,000 gallons 
of oil contaminated with PCBs, a "highly toxic carcinogen." Id. at 497. Furthermore, the 
abandonment of those facilities "aggravated already existing dangers by halting security meas-
ures that prevented public entry, vandalism and fire." Id. at 499 n.3. 
199 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988). 
200474 U.S. at 505. 
201 Id. The Court concluded that § 959(b) was additional evidence of Congressional intent that 
the Code does not pre-empt all non-bankruptcy law. The Court acknowledged that § 959(b) 
applies only to the situation where the trustee operates the debtor's business but not when the 
trustee is liquidating the business. Nevertheless, the majority continued that although § 959(b) 
does not directly address abandonment, that section supports the Court's conclusion that the 
Code was not intended to pre-empt all non-bankruptcy state laws. See In re Heldor Indus., 131 
B.R. 578, 587 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (holding § 959(b) not applicable to trustees that are liquidating 
the estate, rather than managing it), vacated on other grounds, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6791 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (lower court opinion a nullity because objection withdrawn prior to decision); In re 
Corona Plastics, 99 B.R. 231, 237 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (same); In re Borne Chems., 54 B.R. 126, 
135 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984) (same). See also Lawlor, supra note 151, at 846; Claar, supra note 5, at 
46. 
200 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507. See In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d 1449, 1460 (11th Cir. 1992). 
Put more eloquently by one court, "Notwithstanding the desire for calm seas leeward of the 
rocks of regulation and for full sails, the Code does not change the business and regulatory 
environment in which a debtor operates." In re Beker Ind., 57 B.R. 611, 623 (Bankr. S.D.N .Y. 
1986). 
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ating the business of the debtor, and not where the trustee is liquida-
ting the business (as was the case in Midlantic).?JJ3 Nonetheless, the 
Court used the provision to support its conclusion.204 
Although Midlantic expressly reserved the question of what prior-
ity the clean-up costs deserved,205 some courts have held that the 
Supreme Court's decision supports the theory that payment of actual 
postpetition environmental response costs and fines is sufficiently 
necessary to be entitled to administrative expense priority.206 These 
courts reason that if, under Midlantic, the trustee cannot abandon 
contaminated property in contravention of a state's environmental 
laws, then, under § 959(b), the trustee cannot maintain or possess 
contaminated property in continuous violation of that same state 
environmentallaw.?JJ7 Therefore, costs incurred by the state to satisfy 
remediation requirements are necessary expenses to fulfill legal obli-
gations of the estate.206 
Other courts reject the idea that any violation of environmental law 
is a necessary expense of the estate under § 503. These courts grant 
administrative priority for environmental claims only where the con-
tamination represents what the court determines to be an "imminent 
and identifiable hazard to public health and welfare."209 These courts 
203 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505. 
204Id. 
206Id. at 498 n.2. 
206 See, e.g., In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1458-59; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1010 
(2d Cir. 1991); In re Wall 'lUbe & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Nat'l 
Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397,413 (N.D. Tex. 1992); In re Better-Brite Plating, 105 B.R. 912, 917 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 1989), vacated on other grcmnds, 136 B.R. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1990); In re FCX, 96 B.R. 
49,54 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); In re Peerless Plating, 70 B.R. 943, 946-48 (Bankr. WD. Mich. 
1987); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 781 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987); In re Pierce Coal and Constr., 65 
B.R. 521, 531 (Bankr. N.D. W Va. 1986) (dicta); In re Microfab, 105 B.R. 161, 169 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1989) (dicta). 
207 See In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1458-;59; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1010; In 
re Wall 'lUbe & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d at 122. 
208 See id.; In re Peerless Plating, 70 B.R. at 946; In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 778. Courts have 
also awarded administrative expense priority under the same theory to environmental fines and 
penalties levied for postpetition violations. See In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1454; In re 
Charlesbank Laundry, 755 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1985); In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. 827, 830 
(D. Kan. 1991); In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. 493, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1991). 
209 See, e.g., Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 
16-17 (4th Cir. 1988) (disallowed administrative priority where no serious health risk, and where 
the hazards were speculative or could await appropriate action by environmental agency, noting 
fact that Agency had taken no enforcement action); In re N at'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 413 (allowed 
administrative priority only for costs necessitated by conditions that posed inuninent and 
identifiable harm to environment and public health); In re Shore, 134 B.R. 572, 580 (Bankr. D. 
Tex. 1991) (denied administrative priority where no showing of imminent and identifiable harm); 
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rely on decisions that interpret the Midlantic exception to abandon-
ment very narrowly, holding that a trustee's right to abandon envi-
ronmentally impacted property is limited only by the precondition 
that the trustee remediate an "imminent and identifiable" danger 
present on the property proposed to be abandoned.210 Applying this 
narrow interpretation of Midlantic to administrative expense mo-
tions, courts reason that if a simple violation of state law is not enough 
to justify limiting the trustee's abandonment power, then it should not 
be enough to justify awarding administrative priority for reimburse-
ment claims.211 
In re FCX, 96 B.R. at 55 (allowed administrative priority only for those environmental clean-up 
costs reasonably required to remove immediate threat to public health, emphasizing that court's 
judgment of imminency, not that of EPA, is dispositive); In re Microfab, 105 B.R. at 163 (held 
trustee only bound by environmental laws reasonably calculated to protect public health and 
safety from imminent and identifiable harm); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 781 (allowed administra-
tive priority where illegal storage of waste containing PCB's constituted imminent and iden-
tifiable danger). But see In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1458 (allowed administrative priority for 
fines where no evidence that violations posed imminent health hazard); In re Peerless Plating, 
70 B.R. at 948-49 (held clean-up costs necessary, despite lack of clear evidence of imminent 
harm). 
210 See, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 16 (trustee only required to "take adequate 
precautionary measures to ensure that the public is not threatened" before abandonment); 
Leavell v. Karnes, 143 B.R. 212 (S.D. Ill. 1990) (lack of imminent danger, rather than trustee's 
compliance with environmental laws, is requisite to abandonment); In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 
572, 578-79 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991) (allowed abandonment in contravention of environmental 
laws where no showing of imminent and identifiable harm, citing lack of urgency by state agency 
and EPA); In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45, 49-50 (D.N.J. 1990) (trustee allowed 
to abandon contaminated public water system in contravention of state environmental regula-
tions absent showing of ''imminent and identifiable harm" to public from such abandonment, 
citing lack of enforcement by Agency); White v. Coon (In re Purco), 76 B.R. 523, 533-34 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1987) (allowed abandonment in contravention of state law where there was no showing 
that public health and safety were not protected adequately, citing lack of interest of Agency); 
In re FCX, 96 B.R. at 55 (polluted property may be abandoned from debtor's estate in contra-
vention of state and federal environmental laws as long as debtor's violations posed no immedi-
ate threat to public health and safety and no imminent danger of death or illness); In re Franklin 
Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 269 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (trustee permitted to abandon drums of 
hazardous waste in violation of state environmental law where trustee took at least minimal 
steps to protect public, citing lack of state enforcement); In re Oklahoma Ref., 63 B.R. 562, 
565~6 (Bankr. W.D. Ok!. 1986) (trustee allowed to abandon real estate surrounding oil refinery 
in contravention of Oklahoma environmental law where pollution at site did not present imme-
diate and menacing harm to public health and safety). 
211 See In re Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 16; In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 413; In re Shore, 
134 B.R. at 580; In re FCX, 96 B.R. at 55; In re Microfab, 105 B.R. at 163; In re Stevens, 68 
B.R. at 781. 
In addition, where the cost of remediation vastly exceeds the available assets of the estate, 
courts have further refused administrative priority where the environmental law is so onerous 
as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself. The courts reason that the trustee or 
debtor in possession cannot be ordered to satisfy a clean-up obligation that he does not have 
financial resources to satisfy. See In re Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 17 (held that only where 
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2. Preservation of the Estate 
Even if the cost is considered to be necessary, environmental clean-
up costs must also "preserve" the estate to qualify for administrative 
expense priority under § 503.212 In upholding administrative expense 
priority for Agency clean-up reimbursement claims and fines, courts 
have employed the theory that the estate is "preserved" by expendi-
tures that keep the estate in compliance with the law.213 In other 
words, by discharging the trustee's responsibility to remediate the 
environmental impact of the hazards, the Agency has shouldered a 
burden of the trustee and is thus entitled to administrative expense 
priority.214 
estate has unencumbered assets should bankruptcy court require stricter compliance with state 
environmental law before abandonment is permitted); In re Microfab, 105 B.R. at 169-70 (denied 
administrative priority where no evidence that exhaustion of estate's funds would significantly 
improve condition of site); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. at 269 (allowed abandonment 
where estate's unencumbered assets were insufficient to bring site into compliance with state 
environmental law). But see In re Vernon Sand & Gravel, 93 B.R. 580, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1988) (held financial burden "irrelevant" to administrative priority). 
21211 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988). 
213 See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1009-10 (administrative priority granted 
where response costs incurred by EPA enabled estate to maintain itself in compliance with 
applicable laws); In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d at 123 (hazardous waste site response 
costs incurred by state were granted administrative expense priority where costs were neces-
sary to preserve estate in required compliance with state law); In re Nat'! Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 
413 (held that estate was preserved by protecting environment and public health); In re 
Better-Brite Plating, 105 B.R. 912, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) (held that because trustee is 
required to comply with state laws concerning hazardous waste sites, it follows that costs of 
cleanup must be treated as administrative expenses), vacated on other graunds, 136 B.R. 526 
(E.D. Wis. 1990); In re Vernon Sand & Gravel, 93 B.R. 580, 582 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) 
(expenses sought by state agency were granted administrative priority where such costs were 
necessary both to preserve estate in compliance with Ohio laws, and to protect safety of public); 
In re Peerless Plating, 70 B.R. at 948-49 (administrative priority granted where EPA dis-
charged CERCLA obligation of estate that could not be avoided by abandonment per Midlan-
tic); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 782-83 (administrative priority granted where estate liable for 
costs state incurred removing waste oil in accordance with Maine law); In re Mowbray Engi-
neering, 67 B.R. 34, 35 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (administrative priority granted for costs 
incurred by EPA to decontaminate property abandoned by trustee, stating that EPA stood in 
shoes of trustee in preserving estate); In re Pierce Coal and Constr., 65 B.R. 521, 531 (Bankr. 
N.D. W. Va. 1986) (cost of reclaiming area disturbed by debtor in possession was entitled to 
administrative priority); In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. 278, 286-87 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) 
(costs EPA incurred in discharging CERCLA liability that estate could not avoid were actual, 
necessary cost of preserving estate entitled to administrative priority); In re Laurinburg Oil, 
49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984) (expenses debtor incurred in abating public nuisance 
awarded administrative priority); In re Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 25 B.R. 804, 806 (Bankr. 
D. Vt. 1982) (administrative priority granted to expenses incurred to remove dangerous building 
from debtor's leasehold premises in accordance with city order and to protect public). See also 
Claar, supra note 5, at 46-47. 
214 See In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d at 123. 
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Some courts,215 focussing less on preservation of the estate, have 
further relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Reading v. Brown.216 
In Reading, a fire, caused by the negligence of the receiver acting 
within the scope of his employment, destroyed property in the adjoin-
ing premises.217 The Court held that damages resulting from the neg-
ligence of a receiver, acting within the scope of his or her authority 
as a receiver, give rise to actual and necessary costs of operation for 
the debtor's business and are thereby entitled to priority status.218 In 
following Reading, courts reason that "actual and necessary costs" 
should include costs ordinarily incident to operations of a business, 
such as fines, and should not be limited to costs without which reha-
bilitation would be impossible.219 
Other courts have rejected this analysis of preservation under 
§ 503. These courts instead interpret administrative priority to be 
limited exclusively to costs that preserve the estate for the benefit of 
creditors.2'·olQ Accordingly, these courts would grant administrative pri-
ority only to expenses that directly and substantially benefit the 
estate, reasoning that this limitation is necessary to protect the lim-
215 See, e.g., In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d 1449, 1453-56 (11th Cir. 1992) (punitive civil fines for 
debtor's violation of injunction qualified for administrative priority); In re Wall 'lUbe & Metal 
Prods., 831 F.2d at 123; In re Charlesbank Laundry, 755 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1985) (although 
lack of benefit to estate, civil compensatory fine for debtor's violation of injunction qualified for 
administrative priority); In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. 827, 830 (D. Kan. 1991) (fine for violation 
of strip mining regulation was cost ordinarily incident to operation of business, and thus, was 
administrative expense); In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. at 504 (environ-
mental damages arising from lessee's negligence were entitled to administrative priority); In re 
Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. 656, 659 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992); In re 
Pierce Coal and Constr., 65 B.R. 521, 525 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). But see Burlington N.R.R. 
Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell), 853 F.2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting 
§ 503(b)(1)(A) narrowly to apply only to those costs that benefit debtor's creditors by either 
helping to rehabilitate the business or preserve estate assets); In re Jartran Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 
587 (7th Cir. 1984) (same). See also Claar, supra note 5, at 48-49. 
216 391 U.S. 471 (1968). 
217 Id. at 473. 
218 Id. at 483. The damages were entitled to administrative priority under the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898. 
219 See In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1453-56 (punitive civil fines for debtor's violation of an 
injunction qualified for administrative priority); In re Wall 'lUbe & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d at 123; 
In re Charlesbank Laundry, 755 F.2d at 202 (civil compensatory fine for debtor's violation of an 
injunction qualified for administrative priority); In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. at 830 (fine for 
violation of strip mining regulation was cost ordinarily incident to operation of business, and 
thus, was administrative expense); In re Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. at 659; In re Pierce Coal 
and Constr., 65 B.R. 521, 525 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). 
2ID See, e.g., In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 706; In re White Motor Corp., 831 F.2d 106, 110 
(6th Cir. 1987); In re Jartran Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Mammoth Mart, 536 
F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 1976); In re Great N. Forest Prods., 135 B.R. 46, 59 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1991). 
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ited assets of the estate for the benefit of the unsecured creditors' 
interests.221 
Therefore, Agencies may have success securing compensation from 
bankrupt PRPs using superlien statutes and administrative priority. 
The opportunity to use these strategies is narrow, however, and suc-
cess is limited. These enforcement strategies are frustrated even 
further by debtors leasing sites they contaminate. 
IV. THE LOOPHOLE IN BANKRUPrCY: A NEW LEASE ON LIFE 
The superlien and administrative expense priority strategies are 
easily frustrated if the debtor leases the contaminated site, rather 
than acting as an owner-operator. A leased site impedes Agency use 
of a superlien because placing a lien on a lease is virtually worthless. 
A lease also obstructs Agency use of administrative expense priority 
because courts have held that a leasehold is not a sufficient ownership 
interest of the estate for administrative expense priority. 
As a lessee, the debtor may be liable, under CERCLA and similar 
state statutes, as an "operator" of a leased site or as an "owner" of a 
"facility" situated on a leased site.222 The term facility may include 
buildings or personal property such as tanks and drums.222 Further-
more, some courts have held that, although only a lessee, the debtor 
is also liable as an "owner" of the contaminated real estate.224 
A Superliens and the Lease 
There is no bankruptcy case law on the issue of the effectiveness 
of liens against debtors with contaminated leased sites, but logically, 
lien statutes would be ineffective.225 Superlien statutes that are lim-
ited in scope to attachment of a contaminated site provide little or no 
opportunity to satisfy an Agency's claim against a debtor if a site is 
221 See In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 706; In re White Motor Corp., 831 F.2d 106, 110 (6th 
Cir.l987). 
222 See, e.g., CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (Supp. 1992); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-13 (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:1O (1990 & Supp. 1992); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.507, .702 (1993). 
228 See In re Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. at 659; In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. 278, 285 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). 
224 See, e.g., United States v. S.C. Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 
1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Corp., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 
1988) (liability affirmed). 
225 See Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 140 (3d Cir. 1985) (noted lack of 
North Carolina statute allowing a lien on a leasehold). See also Ballantine, supra note 162, at 
584; Epling, supra note 160, at 88; Fogel, supra note 7, at 372-77. 
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leased.226 A debtor's property interest is limited to its leasehold inter-
est. While it is possible to put a lien on a lease interest, the lien would 
only attach to a debtor's limited leasehold interest in the contaminated 
site, rather than the more valuable ownership interest. In most cases 
this lease interest would be virtually worthless relative to the cost of 
cleanup. The value of this leasehold right would depend on the desir-
ability of the site to other potential lessees. The desirability of lease-
holds could be particularly low if the site were contaminated. 
Broader reaching superlien statutes that attach to all the PRP's 
real and personal property and its revenue unrelated to the leased 
site would prove only slightly more useful.227 Superlien statutes pro-
vide super priority status only to revenue and property connected to 
the contaminated site itself. Therefore, a super priority lien on per-
sonal property and revenue from the contaminated site would provide 
significant value only if the personal property on the site had substan-
tial value and the site generated attachable income. There is no guar-
antee, however, of such income being generated, particularly if the 
debtor discontinues operations at the contaminated site. Without such 
income, collection efforts would be limited to any personal property 
abandoned on the site, which could be worthless. 
Looking for value beyond the contaminated site to a debtor's other 
property also provides little satisfaction. Statutory liens lack super 
priority for a lien on a debtor's other property unrelated to the con-
taminated site. Agency lien claims would be subordinated to prior 
encumbrances, which are bound to exist with a bankrupt party. Con-
sequently, an Agency lien on unrelated property, subordinated to 
prior creditors, likely will not be satisfied. Therefore, despite the 
superlien, an Agency reimbursement claim for cleanup of a leased site 
is likely to become a general unsecured claim and risk discharge. 
With contaminated leased sites, super priority liens serve only to 
raise the liability of land owners who lease to debtors. While the 
owner of a contaminated site is jointly and severally liable for any 
contamination under state and federal environmental law, Agency 
action against land owners presents some policy concerns and practi-
cal problems.228 From a policy perspective, land owners in many cases 
play no role in the environmental damage. In such situations, moving 
226 Interview with Margaret Malek, Assistant Attorney General, Envtl. Protection Division, 
Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General, in Boston, Mass. (July 15, 1992). For a discussion 
of statutory lien provisions, see infra Section III. A. 
227 For a discussion of statutory lien provisions, see infra Section III. A. 
228 Malek, supra note 226. 
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against a land owner provides none of the intended deterrent effect 
against a responsible debtor. Furthermore, from a practical perspec-
tive, land owners often lack sufficient funds or income to clean up the 
contaminated site, and the site value is too low to cover remediation 
costs. 
In order to obtain sufficient funds for cleanup, a landowner may sue 
other jointly and severally liable PRPs, including the debtor, for equi-
table contribution.229 The Code, however, does not guarantee payment 
from a debtor's estate. The drafters of the Code envisioned a lessor's 
damage claims against a bankrupt lessee to be primarily rent delin-
quencies, as evidenced by § 502(b)(6) restricting a lessor's damage 
recovery to a certain percentage of the unpaid rent.230 Moreover, land 
owners may only seek reimbursement for costs incurred. The court 
may disallow any portion of a land owner's contribution claim for costs 
that are unincurred as a contingent claim under § 502(e) of the Code.231 
Finally, any attempt by a land owner to protect against potential 
environmental contamination by a lessee in the lease contract-re-
quiring the lessee/debtor to remediate a contaminated leasehold, for 
example-would be ineffective because § 365(e) of the Code invali-
dates bankruptcy clauses and limitations that might impose on the 
trustee's power to assume or reject a lease.232 
B. Administrative Expense Priority and the Lease 
A leased site also greatly complicates the issue of administrative 
expense priority for postpetition clean-up costS.233 While there are few 
cases on the issue of leased sites in bankruptcy, courts ruling against 
administrative expense priority for environmental claims look closely 
at whether the clean-up costs in question truly preserved the estate.234 
Some courts deny priority for cost reimbursement claims for cleanup 
229 See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
230 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (1988). See In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 707; Int'l Coin & 
Currency, Inc., 18 B.R. 335, 339 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (a claim for damages to leasehold "is not 
within the contemplation of § 502(g)"). 
231 11 U.S.C. § 502 (e) (1988). See In re Dant & Russell, 951 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1991). 
232 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1988). See Fogel, supra note 7, at 348. Only if the debtor assumes the 
lease may the lessor put conditions on the lease relationship. One of the only possible remedies 
for the landlord would be to require a substantial security deposit. Under § 506(a), the lessor 
has the right to secured status for setoffs. These funds may be put toward clean-up costs. This 
approach could be considered impractical, however, given the tremendous cost associated with 
these cleanups. Few lessors would willingly provide the sufficient security deposit. See Fogel, 
supra note 7. 
233 See In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. 493, 499 (Bankr. WD. Mich. 1991). 
234 Claar, supra note 5, at 48. 
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of leased sites under the rationale that the site is not sufficiently part 
of the estate.235 The decisions in this area are inconsistent, however, 
depending greatly on whether the lease has been rejected or has 
expired, and on whether the contamination was caused by personal 
property present on the site. 
1. Rejection of Leases: The Business Judgment Test 
The postpetition treatment of a debtor's unexpired leases is ad-
dressed, along with executory contracts, by § 365 of the Code.236 When 
the debtor files a bankruptcy petition, an unexpired leasehold, as a 
legal and equitable interest of the debtor, is considered property of 
the estate under § 541(a)(1).237 Under § 365(a) of the Code, however, 
the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any 
burdensome unexpired lease of the debtor during the bankruptcy 
proceeding.238 The trustee's power to reject a lease or executory con-
tract under § 365 is an extension of the power to abandon burdensome 
property under § 554.239 
The Code does not provide a standard for rejection of a lease.24o The 
only restriction under § 365(a) refers to the trustee's ability to assume 
a lease, rather than reject one.241 Therefore, to determine if rejection 
of a lease is appropriate, most courts employ the business judgment 
test, which closely resembles the standard for abandonment of prop-
erty under § 554.242 The primary issue under the business judgment 
test is whether rejection of the lease would benefit general unsecured 
235 See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d at 142. 
236 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988). A lease is a particularized form of an executory contract. An 
executory contract is generally defined as a type of contract that "generally includes contracts 
on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 340--44 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303. 
237 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). See In re Arizona Appetito Stores, 893 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1990); 
In re Computer Communication, 824 F.2d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1987). But see In re Lovitt, 757 F.2d 
1035,1041 (Bankr. 9th Cir.) (leasehold was not property of the estate until assumed), cert. denied 
sub nom. Cheadle v. Appleatchee Riders Assoc., 474 U.S. 849 (1985). There is an exception for 
a nonresidential lease that has expired pre or postpetition. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). 
238 11 U .S.C. § 365(a) (1988). If the trustee doesn't assume or reject an unexpired lease within 
60 days of the bankruptcy filing, it is assumed rejected and must be surrendered to the lessor. 
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1988). 
239 See In re Lovitt, 757 F.2d at 1041. 
240 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 & 365 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
241 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1988). 
242 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); Group 
of Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 549, reh'g denied, 318 
U.S. 803 (1943); In re Lovitt, 757 F.2d at 1041; Lubrizol Ent. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 
F.2d 1043,1046-47 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); In re Hawaii Dimensions, 
47 B.R. 425, 428 (D. Haw. 1985); In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. 798, 800 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); 
In re Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp., 59 B.R. 129, 135 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). 
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creditors by maximizing the value of the debtor's estate.243 In order 
to maximize the trustee's responsibility for administering the estate 
and to expedite the proceedings, courts accord great deference to the 
trustee's or the debtor in possession's decision to reject a lease, refus-
ing approval only where the decision is clearly erroneous, too specu-
lative, or contrary to Code provisions.244 
Despite this great deference given to the trustee's judgment, some 
courts employ a balancing of interests when applying the business 
judgment test.245 Courts have noted that they should be flexible, ex-
ercising discretion fairly in the interest of all who have had the mis-
fortune of dealing with the debtor.246 It is not clear whether the 
business judgment test should also include consideration of the Mid-
lantic Court's environmental hazard restriction on a trustee's ability 
to abandon property under § 554.247 The Midlantic Court, however, 
243 See, e.g., Lubrizol Ent., 756 F.2d at 1048 (impact to nondebtor of rejection of executory 
contract is irrelevant); In re Meehan, 59 B.R. 380, 385-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (declining to authorize 
rejection where unsecured creditors would receive 100% satisfaction with or without rejection); 
In re Hawaii Dimensions, 47 B.R. 425, 428 (D. Haw. 1985) (hardship on nondebtor is not a factor 
to be weighed in determining whether to approve rejection); In re Florence Chi-Feng Huang, 
23 B.R. 798, 801 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (primary issue to be determined with business judgment 
test is whether rejection would benefit general unsecured creditors); In re Yellow Limousine 
Serv., 22 B.R. 807, 808 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (business judgment test involves determination 
of whether rejection benefits estate); In re Flying Airways, 328 F. Supp. 1256, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 
1971) (determination to permit rejection of lease is based on benefit of lease to estate). But see 
In re Federated Dep't Stores, 131 B.R. 808, 812-13 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (permitting rejection of 
lease to benefit of debtor, despite no obvious benefit to creditors); Borman's, Inc. v. Allied 
Supermarkets, 706 F.2d 187, 189 (6th Cir.) (noting in dicta that burden or hardship to parties 
beyond debtor, including creditors, of lease rejection is not factor), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 
(1983). 
244 See, e.g., Lubrizol Ent., 756 F.2d at 1047 (court reviewed debtor's decision to reject execu-
tory contract under clearly erroneous standard); In re Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp., 59 B.R. 
at 136 (only extraordinary circumstances would prompt court to second guess the debtor's 
presumptively sound business judgment); In re By-Rite Distrib., 47 B.R. 660, 668 n.10 (Bankr. 
D. Utah) (judgment of debtor in possession should be given great deference), rev'd on other 
grounds, 55 B.R. 740 (D. Utah 1985); Allied Technology v. R.B. Brunneman & Sons, 25 B.R. 484, 
495 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (rejection should only be restricted if decision is clearly erroneous, 
too speculative or contrary to Code provisions). 
245 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); Group 
of Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. at 549 (before allowing 
rejection of collective bargaining agreement under § 365(a), court must consider impact on 
debtor, creditors and employees); In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d. Cir. 1979) (trustee and 
ultimately court must exercise their discretion fairly in interest of all who have had misfortune 
of dealing with debtor); In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 B.R. 561, 563-B4 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wash. 1983) (held that equity would not permit approval of rejection that would force nondebtor 
out of business). 
246 See In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d. Cir. 1979); In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 
B.R. 561, 563-B4 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983). 
247 Compare United States v. F.E. Gregory & Sons, Inc., 58 B.R. 590, 592 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1986) (held Midlantic makes clear that defendant is treated no differently as lessee than as 
186 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:145 
did support its holding with a decision by one court to condition 
approval of a lease rejection on compliance with state law.248 In In re 
Chicago Rapid Transit Company, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
conditioned the rejection of a real estate lease by the debtor, a railroad 
company, on continued operation of its railroad line until the state 
could grant leave to abandon the operation, as required by state law.249 
Under § 365(g) of the Code, the lease rejection is treated as a 
breach of contract occurring immediately before the date of the bank-
ruptcy filing.250 While the lease rejection does not necessarily termi-
nate the lease, requiring immediate vacation of the leasehold by the 
debtor, it does remove the leasehold from the property of the estate.251 
Furthermore, similar to a lease that expires postpetition,252 a lease 
that is rejected postpetition is treated retroactively, as though the 
leasehold never became part of the estate.253 Therefore, once the lease 
expires or has been rejected, the trustee no longer has any right, title, 
or legal responsibility over the leased property, and the bankruptcy 
court has no jurisdiction over the property.254 Consequently, damage 
claims related to postpetition leasehold rejection are treated retroac-
tively, under § 502, as though the claims arose prepetition.255 These 
prepetition claims are then relegated to general unsecured status.256 
trustee, although court addressed lease rejection under § 554 rather than § 365) with In re Circle 
K, CIV-91-1000-PHX-RGS at 2 (D. Ariz. December 29,1992) (argued Midlantie is not applicable 
to lease rejections). 
248 474 U.S. 494, 500 (1985), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986). 
249 See 129 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir.), em. denied sub nom. Chicago Junction R. Co. v. Sprague, 317 
U.S. 683 (1942). 
250 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988). 
261 See In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1978) (decided under § 70(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act); In re Storage Technologies, 53 B.R. 471, 475 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985). 
262 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2) (1988). 
263 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988). See Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & 
Russell), 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp., 59 B.R. 129, 
133 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); In re OPM Leasing Services, 30 B.R. 642, 650 (Bankr. S.D.N .Y. 1983). 
254 In re Lovitt, 757 F.2d 1035 (Bankr. 9th Cir.), em denied sub nom. Cheadle v. Appleatchee 
Riders Assoc., 474 U.S. 849 (1985); In re Corona Plastics, 99 B.R. 231, 237 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989); 
In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 709. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). 
266 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1988). 
256 See In re Lovitt, 757 F.2d at 1041; In re Corona Plastics, 99 B.R. at 237; In re Dant & 
Russell, 853 F.2d at 709. For the purposes of awarding administrative priority to lessors for 
postpetition rent prior to rejection under § 365(d)(3), courts have held that the lease rejection 
is deemed to have occurred at the point the court approved the rejection, reasoning it would be 
unjust enrichment to allow free use of the land by the debtor during the time the trustee was 
deciding whether to reject the lease. See generally In re Valley Steel Prods. Co., 147 B.R. 168 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (effective date of lease rejection under § 365 was date on which court 
approved rejection); In re Worth Stores, 130 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); In re Federated 
Dep't. Stores, 131 B.R. 808 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
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2. Rejected or Expired Contaminated Leaseholds 
If the lease of a contaminated site is rejected or has expired, courts 
have held that claims for clean-up costs will not be awarded adminis-
trative expense priority.257 The courts reason that these costs do not 
preserve the estate because the rejected or expired leasehold has 
never legally been part of the estate.258 Therefore, any clean-up work 
done on the property would not preserve the estate for the benefit of 
creditors.259 Moreover, these courts reason, it would arguably be be-
yond the court's discretion to approve administrative priority for 
expenses on property that was never part of the estate because the 
court has no authority over such property.260 
Courts refusing administrative priority further rely on the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in In re Dant & Russell.261 In Dant 
& Russell, the debtor leased certain real property from Burlington 
Northern and operated a treatment and storage facility on the site.262 
The site had "massive contamination."263 The landlord sought admin-
istrative priority for contribution claims for CERCLA remediation 
costs of $25,000 incurred postpetition on the debtor's rejected lease-
hold, claiming the debtor was jointly liable.264 The court denied the 
landlord's motion for administrative expense priority, holding that the 
breach of an unexpired lease, and any consequent damages, occurred 
prepetition and therefore the environmental claims should be re-
garded as arising prepetition and could not qualify for administrative 
priority.265 
257 See In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 709; Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 
137, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1985). 
258 See In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 59 B.R. at 135--37 (held that even if it could be 
shown that lease agreement imposed liability for cost of cleanup on debtor, with court approval 
debtor could reject lease, leaving lessor with prepetition general unsecured claim, citing 365(g)); 
Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d at 142-43 (rejecting landlord's claim for adminis-
trative priority for costs of cleanup of leasehold occupied by debtor as sublessor); In re T.P. Long 
Chems., 45 B.R. 278, 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (EPA did not claim it was entitled to 
administrative priority for cleanup of ruptured tank sold by trustee because tank was no longer 
property of estate at time of release). 
259 See In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 59 B.R. at 135-,')7; Southern Ry. v. Johnson 
Bronze Co., 758 F.2d at 142-43; In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. at 28l. 
260 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d); In re Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp., 59 B.R. at 135. 
261 In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988). 
262Id. at 702. 
263Id. 
264Id. 
265Id. at 709. 
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3. Negligence Claims on Leased Sites 
Other courts have awarded administrative priority in lease situ-
ations based on the Reading266 rationale that administrative expenses 
should go beyond costs that simply preserve the estate to include 
costs ordinarily incident to running the business.267 These courts rea-
son that estate liability arising from negligent postpetition operations 
does not depend on the estate's property interest in the facility and 
may not be abandoned with the property.268 Therefore, negligence 
awards assessed as a consequence of postpetition activities are "ac-
tual, necessary expenses of preserving the estate."269 Most of these 
cases arise out of private landlord negligence actions against a debt-
or/lessee for contribution for clean-up costS.270 In In re N.P. Mining 
Co., however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit applied the same rationale to award administrative priority 
for punitive civil fines assessed by an Agency as a consequence of 
postpetition business operations on a leased site.271 
266 Reading v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 484--85 (1968). 
267 See, e.g., In re N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d 1449, 1454 (11th Cir. 1992) (punitive civil fines assessed 
as consequence of the operation of bankruptcy estate's business postpetition on leased site were 
actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving estate); In re Circle K, 137 B.R. 346, 351 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (held lessors' claims for expenses incurred in cleaning up environmental 
damage could be awarded administrative priority if debtor were shown to be negligent in efforts 
undertaken postpetition to seal leaking underground storage tanks); In re Great N. Forest 
Prods., 135 B.R. 46, 62 n.19 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991) (noted allowance of administrative priority 
for lessor if environmental damage arose from lessor's negligent postpetition operation); In re 
Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. 493, 504 (Bankr. WD. Mich. 1991) (administrative 
priority awarded to landlord clean-up costs based on breach of contract and negligence by debtor 
in possession on site with expired lease); In re Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. 656, 659-S0 (D. 
Mass. 1991) (claim of postpetition purchaser of chapter 7 debtor's property for indemnification 
or contribution under CERCLA for past and future response costs incurred in compliance with 
EPA order was entitled to administrative priority where purchaser's claim arose under CER-
CLA postpetition), a/I'd, 954 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992); In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. at 289 (noted 
that Reading is consistent with its holding that estate's liability for contaminated drums can 
not be abandoned with drums, and thus, clean-up costs are entitled to administrative priority); 
cf Int'l Coin & Currency, Inc., 18 B.R. 335, 339 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (damage to leased premises 
caused by chapter 11 debtor and its employees were awarded administrative priority). 
266 See In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. at 284--85. 
269 See id. 
270 See, e.g., In re Circle K, 137 B.R. at 351; In re Great N. Forest Prods., 135 B.R. at 62 n.19; 
In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. at 504; In re Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. 
at 659-60. 
271 963 F.2d at 1454. In N.P. Mining, an administrative priority claim was asserted by the 
Alabama Surface Mining Commission against the debtor as punishment for environmental 
violations. After filing for chapter 11 protection, the debtor continued to operate the leased mine 
site as a debtor in possession for sixteen months. Then a trustee was appointed, and the mining 
operation was shut down. The trustee only administered the estate, neither correcting the 
violations nor paying the penalties. Id. 
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4. Personal Property 
Other courts have avoided the lease issue altogether by limiting the 
administrative expense analysis to the existence of personal property 
remaining on the leased site, such as leaking tanks and buried 
drums.272 These courts allow administrative priority for expenses in-
curred in removing tanks and buried drums and in cleaning up the 
contaminated surrounding soi1.273 Under CERCLA and similar state 
environmental statutes, the tanks and drums qualify under the broad 
definition of "facilities," creating liability.274 The courts reason that, 
under § 541(a), a debtor's personal property at filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition, including tanks and drums, becomes property of the 
estate.275 Furthermore, the contaminated tanks and drums must re-
main property of the estate because under Midlantic, they may not 
be abandoned postpetition in violation of environmentallaws.276 More-
over, under 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), the estate may not hold them in viola-
tion of state law.277 Therefore, the courts conclude that costs incurred 
by an Agency to discharge liability with regard to the abandoned 
personal property are "actual, necessary costs of preserving the es-
tate" and entitled to administrative priority.278 
272 See, e.g., White v. Coon (In re Purco), 76 B.R. 523, 532-33 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (abandon-
ing drums on leased property); In re Berry, 84 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1987) (aban-
doning leaking tank on leased property); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 1986) (abandoning drums on leased property). 
273 See, e.g., In re Wall Thbe & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987) (costs awarded 
administrative priority were those state incurred in connection with tanks and drums containing 
hazardous waste that remained in debtor's estate after rest of property was conveyed back to 
lessor); In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, 125 B.R. at 504 (barrels left on leased 
property where lease expired postpetition before conversion to chapter 7 were property of 
estate and could not be abandoned, so incurred removal costs were entitled to administrative 
priority); In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. at 285 (court awarded administrative priority for 
response costs incurred postpetition by EPA to remove drums buried on debtor's leased site); 
In re Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 25 B.R. 804, 806 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (expenses incurred 
in removing dangerous building from debtor's leasehold awarded administrative expense priority). 
274 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) defining "facility" as follows: "Facility" means (A) any 
building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or 
publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage 
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous 
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; 
but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel. See also In re T.P. 
Long Chems., 45 B.R. at 284. 
275 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988). See In re T.P. Long Chems., 45 B.R. at 283. 
276 See In re Wall Thbe & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d at 121; In re Kent Holland Die Casting & 
Plating, 125 B.R. at 504. 
277 See In re Wall Thbe & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d at 121; In re Kent Holland Die Casting & 
Plating, 125 B.R. at 504. 
278 See In re Wall Thbe & Metal Prods., 831 F.2d at 121; In re Kent Holland Die Casting & 
Plating, 125 B.R. at 504. 
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V. CIRCLE K: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE LOOPHOLE 
The In re Circle [(279 case provides a vivid example of the treatment 
of contaminated leases in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court and dis-
trict court permitted the bankrupt Circle K corporation to avoid 
environmental liability by rejecting leases for its gas station sites 
located throughout the country. 
A. Background 
Circle K operates thousands of convenience stores in over 30 states 
nationwide.2ffi These convenience stores typically include a small gro-
cery store and self-service gasoline pumpS.281 The majority of these 
stores are located on leased sites and include underground storage 
tanks (USTs) to store gasoline and diesel fuel that is transferred 
through pipes to above-ground dispensers.282 Leaks were discovered 
in numerous USTs across the country.283 The leaks have resulted in 
varying degrees of contamination of air, soil, and ground water at 
many of these locations.284 State and federal statutes require owners 
and/or operators of USTs to remove those tanks after they are taken 
out of use and to assess and to remediate any contamination of soil 
and ground water the leaking USTs caused.285 
On May 15, 1990, Circle K filed a voluntary petition for relief under 
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.286 Circle K's reorganization effort 
included a lease rejection program intended to pare down the com-
pany's size, to reduce costs, to eliminate unprofitable locations, and to 
redirect cash for operations and capital improvements at the remain-
ing stores.287 Accordingly, Circle K filed numerous petitions after the 
filing date to reject leases, subleases, and attendant contracts cover-
ing over 1,000 stores.288 Prior to vacating the rejected leaseholds, 
Circle K ceased operations; made preliminary estimates of leakage 
based on site inspection and its inventory records; and then drained, 
279 In re Circle K, CIV-91-100O-PHX-RGS (D. Ariz. December 29, 1992). There is a possibility 
that the decisions in the Circle K case will be vacated pursuant to a settlement agreement. 
Telephone interview with Karen Cordry, National Association of Attorneys General (September 
3, 1993). 
200 Id. at 2. 
281Id. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287Id. 
288 Id. 
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sealed, and vented the USTs.289 Under the terms of its leases, Circle 
K then left the USTs on the property.290 These steps comport with the 
requirements for temporary tank closure under applicable state law.291 
State environmental agencies and the land ownersllessors objected 
to Circle K's motions for an order approving rejection of closed store 
leases, claiming that Circle K failed to comply with the state laws 
governing abandonment of USTs.292 The plaintiffs argued that Circle 
K failed to assess and to remediate soil and groundwater contamina-
tion adequately at numerous leased sites nationwide.293 The plaintiffs 
demanded that the court enjoin Circle K from rejecting the leases 
until the sites were adequately investigated and remediated.294 
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that Circle K was abandoning 
impermissibly USTs and contaminated soil by using lease rejection 
under § 365 to sidestep the Midlantic restriction on abandonment 
under § 554, which would not permit abandonment in contravention 
of state law.295 The plaintiffs insisted that there is no logical reason to 
distinguish between the effects of unremediated contamination re-
sulting from abandonment of property versus lease rejection.296 Plain-
tiffs argued that Midlantic applies wherever there is an existing 
danger and a bankruptcy estate fails to comply with applicable state 
laws that are reasonably designed to protect the public health and 
safety.297 
The plaintiffs further argued that 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) should apply 
to Circle K because it continued to operate the convenience store 
business.298 Under that provision, Circle K should be required to 
comply fully with all applicable state laws at all sites, those where it 
currently operates, as well as those where it rejected leases.299 Finally, 
citing In re Chicago Rapid Transit Company, the plaintiffs urged the 
court to condition Circle K's lease rejections on compliance with the 
state law, requiring the debtor to prove the absence of contamination 
and full compliance with applicable UST laws.30o Allowing the rejec-
tion of these leaseholds in their present condition would impermissi-
289Id. 
29°Id. 
291Id. 
292 In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1991). 
293Id. 
294Id. 
295Id. 
296Id. 
297Id. at 6. 
298Id. at 5-7. 
299Id. 
300Id. 
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bly shift the burden of assessment and cleanup onto the Agencies and 
the innocent land owners.30l 
Circle K responded, citing Dant & Russell, that as a matter of law 
Midlantic is not applicable to lease rejections.302 Moreover, even if 
Midlantic were to apply as a matter of law, the facts in the case did 
not support a sufficient finding of imminent and identifiable harm to 
justify restricting the lease rejection.303 Furthermore, Circle K argued 
that, as a matter of public policy, extending Midlantic to this case 
would frustrate Congress's intent to encourage corporate reorganiza-
tions by forcing debtors to retain unprofitable leases.304 Finally, the 
unsecured creditor committee argued in an amicus curiae brief that 
extending Midlantic to this case would create inequitable non-statu-
tory priority claims in favor of the land owners and states.305 
The bankruptcy court did not conduct a full evidentiary hearing to 
determine exactly the nature and type of contamination at each site 
on which the debtor sought to reject a lease.3OO Although the bank-
ruptcy court twice offered to convene an evidentiary hearing if a 
party of interest was prepared to establish that an imminent danger 
existed on one or more of the leaseholds, there was insufficient re-
sponse.307 The state Agencies argued that providing sufficient evi-
dence for the over 1000 sites represented a substantial financial and 
administrative burden.30s The parties agreed that leaking USTs posed 
several potential health hazards, including contamination of ground-
water and soil; escape of fumes; and release of several carcinogens 
including benzene, toluene, ethylene, and xylene.309 Ultimately, how-
ever, the parties agreed that the precise amount of contamination was 
unknown, the degree of environmental damage was unknown, the 
danger to the public health and safety was unknown, and the costs of 
site remediation were also unknown.3IO Therefore, despite the indica-
301 Id. 
300 Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell), 853 F.2d 700, 702 
(9th Cir. 1988). In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at 8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1991). 
300 Id. 
304 Id. 
306 Id. 
306 Id. at 3-4. 
307 Id. 
300 Id.; Les Romo, Abandonment, Lease Rejections and Discharge: Thorny Issues for Envi-
ronmental Claimants in Bankruptcy Proceedings 8-9 (February, 1993) (paper presented by 
Assistant Attorney General, Envtl. Protection Division, Texas Office of the Attorney General 
at N at'l Association of Attorneys General Bankruptcy Conference in New Orleans, LA, on file 
with author). 
300 In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at *3-*4 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1991). 
310Id. 
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tion of extensive contamination, the bankruptcy court proceeded on 
the assumption that none of the leaseholds constituted an imminent 
danger to the public health.3ll 
B. The Bankruptcy Court Holding 
Mter considering the parties' pleadings and hearing oral argument, 
the bankruptcy court determined that the environmental concerns 
implicated in the lease rejections were of such a nature as to be 
addressed adequately within the provisions of § 365, which permits 
postpetition lease rejections.312 The court concluded that there was no 
need to rewrite § 365 in these particular factual circumstances in 
order to impose additional requirements on Circle K, the debtor in 
possession.313 
1. The Business Judgment Test 
In determining whether Circle K's lease rejection motions were 
proper under § 365, the bankruptcy court applied the business judg-
ment test.314 Under the test, the court weighed the benefit to creditors 
of rejection of the contaminated leaseholds against the harm to the 
lessors and the state environmental agencies.315 Deferring to the wis-
dom of Circle K, the court determined that the rejection of the con-
taminated leaseholds provided a clear benefit to Circle K's unsecured 
creditors.316 If the leases were' not rejected, the estate would be 
obliged to make substantial payment for environmental cleanup, in 
addition to rent payments at unprofitable store locations.317 
The bankruptcy court then examined the corresponding damage to 
the lessors and the states caused by the lease rejections, holding that 
the damage was insufficient to outweigh the benefits to the estate.3IB 
First, because the lessors were jointly and severally liable with Circle 
K under environmental statutes, rejection of the lease would not 
affect the lessors' liability.319 Secondly, the court noted that environ-
mental laws and the Code provide lessors opportunities to sue the 
311 [d. 
312 [d. at 34-i). 
313 [d. 
314 [d. at 23. 
315 [d. at 24. 
316 [d. at 39. 
317 [d. 
318 [d. at 36-8. 
319 [d. at 36. 
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debtor for contribution.320 The Agencies, according to the court, would 
also suffer little harm due to the rejection because the Agencies would 
still have the option of filing claims against the lessor for clean-up 
costS.321 Furthermore, the Agencies were free to enforce their police 
power under § 362(b) of the Code.322 
2. Midlantic and Lease Rejection 
Having determined that the lease rejections were proper under the 
business judgment test, the Circle K court turned to consider the 
petitioners' arguments concerning Midlantic.323 The court rejected 
the petitioners' argument that the public policy restriction on the 
trustee's abandonment power created under Midlantic should pre-
vent lease rejections under § 365 of the Code.324 The court reasoned 
that in Midlantic the Supreme Court created the narrow exception 
to the abandonment power under § 554 because the result of literal 
application of the statute would have been demonstrably at odds with 
the intent of its drafters.325 The bankruptcy court concluded that, 
unlike Midlantic, it did not appear necessary in this case to rewrite 
the lease rejection statute by judicial fiat.326 
The court explained that in Midlantic, by abandoning the property, 
the trustee was releasing the property imprudently back to the insol-
vent debtor, who would be unable to facilitate cleanup, thus ultimately 
burdening the state Agency.327 In contrast, the bankruptcy court con-
cluded that there were no similar concerns in this case because the 
property leased by Circle K was being conveyed back to the lessors, 
who had a myriad of remedies available under § 365 of the Code.328 
The court held that § 365 as drafted by Congress appeared well able 
to handle the environmental issue presented in the case.329 The court 
supported its holding with Kovacs, where the Supreme Court noted 
it would be sufficient to release property back to the original owner 
300 Id. at 37. 
321 Id. at 38. 
322 Id. For a discussion of § 362(b), see infra Section 1I.B.1.a-b. 
323 Id. at 32-6. 
324 Id. 
32); Id.; In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at 34-5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1991) (citing the 
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Ron Pair Ent., 489 U.S. 235, 245 (1989)). 
326 In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at 34-35 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1991). 
327 Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494. In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at 35 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
1991). 
328 In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at 34-35. 
329 Id. 
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who would have to comply with the state environmental law to the 
extent of his or her ability.330 
The bankruptcy court did note that Midlantic might apply where 
there was evidence of a debtor abandoning a UST under the guise of 
a lease rejection.331 Following cases that interpret the Midlantic ex-
ception narrowly,332 however, the court added that the abandoned 
UST would also have to represent an imminent and identifiable public 
harm for the public policy restriction to apply to a lease rejection.333 
The court concluded that the facts of this case did not indicate such a 
serious threat.334 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) and Lease Rejection 
Finally, the bankruptcy court also dismissed the petitioners' argu-
ment that Circle K's lease rejections would violate § 959(b), holding 
that the trustee or debtor in possession need not comply with laws 
under § 959(b) before rejection of leases.335 The court reasoned that 
§ 959(b) applies to the trustee or debtor in possession only if they are 
managing or operating the site, not if they are liquidating the site.336 
The court supported its decision by citing decisions that have refused 
priority to state claims where the trustee is merely liquidating the 
property of the estate.337 
The court noted, however, that the facts of this case were slightly 
different from traditional liquidation cases.338 By rejecting its leases, 
Circle K was liquidating only part of its business but was continuing 
to operate the remainder.339 Nevertheless, the court concluded that 
even in a partial liquidation situation, § 959(b) would not apply to 
specific sites where Circle K was no longer operating the business but 
was simply rejecting the lease.340 The court reasoned that once the 
lease is rejected, the former tenant no longer has any authority over 
the property, so it would be impractical to hold the former tenant 
responsible for compliance with state law.341 The court stated: "Al-
330Id. 
331Id. at 32-,'33. 
332 See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text. 
333 In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at *32-*33. 
334Id. 
335Id. at 25-9. 
336 I d. at 26. 
337Id. See infra notes 210-11. 
338 In re Circle K, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1190 at *28. 
339Id. 
34°Id. at 29 (citing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Dant & Russell). 
341Id. 
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though a debtor may be liable to the landlord or a third party for 
damages arising out of an event which occurred during the tenancy, 
he does not have any ongoing obligation to operate or manage the 
property. And accordingly, § 959(b) is not applicable."342 
C. The District Court Opinion 
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona affir-
med the bankruptcy court decision on appeal.343 Addressing the issue 
of the applicability of the Midlantic restriction on the abandonment 
power to lease rejections, the district court concluded that some sort 
of threshold fact-finding was necessary before consideration of this 
restriction was appropriate.344 The district court supported this rea-
soning by citing courts that have interpreted the applicability of the 
Midlantic restriction more narrowly.345 Accordingly, the district court 
stated that applying the Midlantic restriction required a factual 
showing of an imminent and identifiable threat to public safety.346 The 
court concluded that the fact finding by the bankruptcy court did not 
indicate any such threat of public harm.347 Finding that the facts of 
this case would not preclude lease rejection even if Midlantic were 
applied, the court declined to reach the question of whether Midlantic 
applies to lease rejections.348 
Addressing the applicability of § 959(b), the district court agreed 
with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that, similar to Midlantic, the 
provision was not applicable in this case because Circle K was not 
managing the leased property, rather it was rejecting the leased 
property in a liquidation situation.349 The district court followed the 
bankruptcy court's reasoning insofar as where a partial liquidation is 
necessary to facilitate reorganization, that portion of a case resembles 
a chapter 7 liquidation case to which § 959(b) would not apply.350 
Therefore, the district court concurred with the bankruptcy court 
342 I d. at 28. 
348 In re Circle K, CIV-91-1000-PHX-RGS at 1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 29, 1992). The District Court 
reviewed the factual findings of the Bankruptcy Court under the clearly erroneous standard 
and the findings of law under the de novo standard of review, citing In re Daniels-Head and 
Assoc., 819 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Id. at 5. 
344 Id. at 12, 18. 
346 Id. See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text. 
346 In re Circle K, CIV-91-100O-PHX-RGS at 10. 
347Id. at 18. 
343 Id. at 17. 
349 I d. at 21. 
350 Id. at 22 (also citing Dant & Russell). 
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decision that Circle K's lease rejections constituted just such a partial 
liquidation to which § 959(b) would not be applicable.351 
The district court concluded that the burden to clean up the sites 
should fall fairly and appropriately on the owners/lessors of the sites 
and the states.352 The court affirmed the bankruptcy court decision 
that Circle K could not be made to clean up these sites either before 
or after the leases were rejected.353 The district court reasoned that 
the land owners had ample remedies available under §§ 365 & 502 of 
the Code. The court also noted that the lessors had benefited from the 
lease, assuming certain risks of contamination.354 The district court 
further noted that the states also had sufficient remedies, including 
the option of giving clean-up judgments the status of statutory liens.355 
VI. AFTER CIRCLE K 
"Bill?" "Yeah?" "Strange things are afoot at the Circle K."356 
Strange, indeed. Circle K's chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization pro-
vides the most recent installment of the strange and terrible saga of 
the conflict between environmental law and the Code. An apparent 
liability loophole exists in the Code for debtors leasing contaminated 
sites. By merely leasing a site the debtor can successfully frustrate 
the remaining two cost recovery opportunities available to Agencies 
under the Code to enforce environmental laws against a bankrupt 
PRP-superliens and administrative expense priority. 
Essentially, with a leased contaminated site, the Agencies are back 
in the bleak position of lowly general unsecured creditors with little 
hope of sufficient compensation. The existence of this loophole may 
encourage more corporations, in an improper attempt at bankruptcy 
planning, to lease sites that risk being contaminated in order to avoid 
the associated liability. If a company is found responsible for contami-
nating a site, it has a much greater ability to simply walk away from 
liability for site cleanup via the bankruptcy proceeding if the site is 
leased rather than owned. This frustrates the deterrent intent of 
351Id. at 21-2. Specifically, the district court stated the following reasons for agreeing with 
the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that § 959(b) should not be applied to this case: Circle K did 
not own any of these sites; the leases on these sites had been properly rejected under § 365 of 
the Code; while Circle K still engaged in the convenience store business nationally, it did not do 
so at the site on which it rejected leases. [d. 
352 [d. at 16,20-1. 
353 [d. at 16-20 (citing Dant & Russell for support). 
354 [d. at 16, 20. 
355 [d. at 21. 
356 Bill & Ted's Excellent Adventure, Nelson Entertainment. 
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environmental laws, potentially burdening the general public with 
financial responsibility for cleanup. 
The basic issue is one of priority within the Code's distribution 
scheme. The Code is silent on the priority of environmental claims, 
giving these claims no special treatment. The Supreme Court has 
twice addressed the issue of environmental law enforcement against 
bankrupt PRPs: first in Ohio v. Kovacs and then again in Midlantic. 
Unfortunately, in both these cases, the Court expressly reserved 
judgment on the issue of what priority environmental clean-up costs 
should receive, leaving the lower courts to grapple with the issue 
themselves.357 The developing case law is extremely inconsistent, with 
environmental claims discharged with no payment in some cases and 
in other cases, paid in full ahead of all other unsecured creditors as 
first priority administrative expenses.358 
Courts have justified denying administrative priority to Agency 
environmental claims based on the state's opportunity to gain secured 
status through statutory liens. Where that option is not available, as 
with a leased site, the courts should be more willing to award admin-
istrative priority, notwithstanding the arguments that the property 
is not part of the estate. Otherwise, the Agency environmental claim 
has little hope of compensation. 
The most sensible long-term solution to this conflict is the proposal 
by one commentator to amend the Code to treat environmental claims 
similar to tax claims, which are given seventh priority in the Code's 
distribution scheme.359 The rationale for this special treatment of tax 
claims in bankruptcy is that allowing the debtor to avoid tax liability 
through bankruptcy would unfairly punish the innocent taxpaying 
community. Unlike the debtor's creditors who made a conscious choice 
to deal with the debtor because of potential financial benefits, the 
taxpayers made no such conscious decision. Moreover, the taxpayers 
are excluded from enjoying the financial benefits. Therefore, the tax-
payers should not share in the debtor's losses. 
The argument to treat environmental claims similarly to tax claims 
is that environmental clean-up costs incurred by the government, like 
unpaid taxes, represent a burden on the community at large. If left 
unreimbursed, environmental clean-up costs incurred by the Agen-
357 Midlantic Nat. Bank v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 498 n.2, reh'g denied, 
475 U.S. 1090 (1986); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985) (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
358 Compare In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 709 (discharging claims) with In re Wall Tube 
& Metal Prods., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987) (allowing administrative priority). 
359 For a full discussion of this issue and possible amendment language, see Claar, supra note 
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cies represent punishment equal to unpaid taxes for the innocent 
taxpayers. Furthermore, from a policy perspective, priority treat-
ment for environmental claims would provide increased certainty of 
reimbursement for Agencies. This greater certainty of reimburse-
ment would encourage Agencies to clean up contaminated sites in a 
more timely fashion, rather than delay in hopes of receiving adminis-
trative expense priority. Accordingly, Agencies would be able to ef-
fectuate more fully the quick response and deterrent intent of envi-
ronmental statutes. 
Finally, giving environmental claims tax claim status would also 
address the lease issue. If the environmental claims were given a 
higher priority, there would be less need to use statutory liens or to 
file for administrative expense priority. Therefore, it would be unim-
portant that cleanup on leased sites cannot qualify for either of these 
higher priority options. The claims on the site, whether leased or not, 
would receive the same priority treatment in the debtor's bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite the tremendous statutory authority available to Agencies 
to ensure remediation of contaminated sites, many PRPs are able to 
avoid punishment through federal bankruptcy protection. If a PRP 
files bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court usually stays any Agency en-
forcement action against the PRp, and then after providing little 
compensation to the low priority Agency claims, the court discharges 
the Agency claims at the end of the bankruptcy proceeding. 
The interference resulting when a PRP files for bankruptcy forces 
Agencies to make creative use of the Code to ensure greater access 
to a PRP's assets. The most successful efforts involve the use of 
superliens and administrative expense priority. While Agencies have 
found some success with these creative efforts, they may be frus-
trated easily by a debtor leasing rather than owning a contaminated 
site. In many cases when the contaminated site is leased the assets of 
the bankrupt PRP are unavailable to satisfy Agency enforcement 
claims. 
Without any compensation from the bankrupt PRP, the financial 
responsibility for cleaning up the site usually falls to the federal or 
state government and so, ultimately, to the taxpayers. This is an 
unfair burden to put on innocent taxpayers. The Code should be 
amended to address this situation. 
